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
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THE
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HELLENIC KINGDOM *prop^s*

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AND

THE GREEK NATION.

BY


GEORGE FINLAY, ESQ.

OF LYOSHA,

PHILHELLENE, HONORARY MAJOR IN THE GREEK SERVICE,
AND MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY OF NATURAL
HISTORY, AT ATHENS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY S. G. HOWE.

Earth is sick,
And heaven is weary, of the hollow words
Which States and Kingdoms utter, when they talk
Of Truth and Justice.—WORDSWORTH.



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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.

TO THE PHILHELLENES OF AMERICA.

TIME was, when the mere announcement of a work on Greece, was received by the American public with interest; and any thing relating to the country, was read with avidity.

That time, however, has gone by; the imperfect narrative of the Greek Revolution is recorded in the rarely consulted page of history; and the sufferings and atrocities which saddened and disgraced it, as well as the heroism and the devotion which dignified and adorned it, are already forgotten.

But, that revolution was only the birth-day of Modern Greece, and rife as it was with scenes of thrilling interest, the seven years that have elapsed since its completion, afford more important study to the statesman, and more interesting speculation to the philanthropist.

It was indeed gratifying, to find that there was

enough of physical courage and strength—enough of patriotism and devotion left among the Greeks, to carry their country through a seven years' war of almost unprecedented horrors and devastations ; it was cheering to think that freemen again trod the plains of Marathon—that the flag of Greece streamed from the walls of the Parthenon, and floated o'er the waves of Salamis : but the all-important questions occurred, whether the people could guard, as well as gain their liberties ; whether they could as wisely act, as they had bravely fought ; and whether the beacon which freedom had lighted upon the frontiers of civilization, would continue to blaze, and to illumine the East, or go out again, and leave all in darkness and despotism.

These questions, the last seven years have been solving ; and many an anxious eye hath been fixed upon Greece ; and many an eager question hath been put to every traveller who had wandered to her shores, about her situation, her institutions, and her prospects. The answers to these questions have generally been as unfavorable, as unsatisfactory and untrue : the world has continued to judge of the character and the actions of the Greeks, by the reports of hasty tourists, of Smyrna traders, or of superficial naval officers, and it has concluded that the Greeks are unworthy of freedom or of respect.

There is, however, a mass of evidence in the real progress which the people have made ; in the eagerness with which they have embraced the few good institutions offered by their rulers ; and in the deter-

mination with which they have resisted the encroachments upon their rights, that has been entirely overlooked except by the intelligent foreigners resident in the country, and by a few abroad, who have had peculiar advantages for ascertaining the real state of things.

It has often occurred to us, when defending the character of the Greeks from what we knew were undeserved aspersions, to be asked in a triumphant tone,—“How do you account for the fact, that almost all traders and travellers, who have been among the two people, invariably say, that they like the Turks better than the Greeks?” The answer is perfectly simple; the trader prefers to deal with the dull Turk upon the same principle that he likes to trade with a stupid Indian, who will take his glass beads for precious stones; but he dislikes the wily Greek, who is a match for him in any speculation, and who will not trade without a sufficient *quid pro quo*. We do not mean that there are no traders with the East, who are willing to extend a fair reciprocity of gain; we know that there are some honorable and high-minded merchants among them, but they are the exceptions, and we know that some of them prefer to deal with the Greeks.

But, as a general rule, trade is trick in the East, and the Greeks owe to Turkish injustice, oppression, and bloody violence, the eminence which they attained as sharpers and traders. They were obliged to cheat, and deceive, and live a life of dissimulation

in order to live at all: the Turks subsisted by violence and rapine; the Greeks by cunning and deceit.

The Greeks who lived in contact with the Turks, became supple and faithless; and those who came in contact with Europeans, and learned their languages, learned too their vices. They formed a distinct class; they were the interpreters of the Turks, and of the foreigners; they were the guides, the valets of travellers—the floating members of society, with whom, and with whom alone, foreigners came in contact, and by whom the whole mass of the Greek nation was, and still is hastily judged, and hastily condemned.

Americans writhe under the sarcasms, and exclaim against the misrepresentations of the Trollopes, the Halls, and the Abdys, who, with a knowledge of their language, manners and customs, spend years of observation among them, and then describe them; but they readily adopt the opinion, formed of the Greeks by travellers, who pass a few weeks in the country, or touch at the seaports, and who, without knowing one word of the language, or coming in contact with any but valets, guides, and shop-keepers, set down the whole nation as a pack of rogues.

They know nothing of the interior, nothing of the language, nothing of the peasantry; nor have they an idea of the natural intelligence, and the acquired knowledge of the mass of the people.

But there are other foreigners, men of education, and talent, and respectability, who have lived for years in Greece, and who have, almost without

an exception, changed the opinions they first formed, and who think so well of the Greeks and the country, and are so sanguine about the march of civilization and improvement there, that they have invested large fortunes, and established themselves in it.

Among them, is George Finlay, Esq. the writer of the following work; a gentleman who embarked heart and soul in the cause of Greece, at the darkest period of her revolutionary struggle; who devoted to her cause the best years of his youth, without ever demanding a dollar for his services; and who, now that her Moslem enemies are all vanquished, devotes himself to defending her by his pen, from her calumniators, and her European enemies. We knew him long and well; we saw his firmness and his attachment to Greece displayed in that dark hour, when the besom of desolation was sweeping her whole land—when the few foreigners whom the sword had spared, were sinking under their sufferings, or flying from apparently inevitable destruction—and when the parasites, who have since fattened under the administrations of Capo D'Istrias, or King Otho, were far off and secure in their homes.

The possession of a large fortune, and his refusal of all recompense, renders Mr. Finlay's Philhellenism unquestionable; but besides this he has every other claim to the confidence of the public; his reputation for integrity and chivalrous feeling, is widely extended in Greece; he possesses the respect of the people, and the confidence of the King, to whom he was Aide-Camp during his minority.

He writes neither for fame, nor for money ; for he has enough of both, to satisfy him. He supposed that the drawing up of the following *exposé* of the internal affairs of Greece, since the revolution, would interest all Philhellenes, and advance her cause ; and without one moment's thought of the consequences to himself, he has done it.

We have long delighted in his friendship, and since we left him on the shores of Greece, after the close of the revolution, we have been favored with his correspondence. He has sent us his MSS. and desired us to present it to the American Philhellenes, which we do with pleasure ; and if the feeble weight of our testimony in favor of the soundness of its views, will add to the confidence with which it is received, we shall be much gratified.

As to the national character of the Greeks, it is very difficult, even for those best acquainted with them, to draw it ; indeed, it is impossible, unless we divide the people into several classes.

As a nation, we may safely call the Greeks a nervous, excitable, and intellectual people. Their physical endowments give them high rank among the Caucasian race ; though swarthy, their skin is fine and clear ; their bodies slender, but well-formed and beautiful ; and the whole organization is such as to make them sensitive, restless, and enterprising. The moral qualities, it must be owned, are not now very apparent, but this is the effect of external causes which soon will cease to exist ; while on the other hand the animal propensities are not strong ; for the people are temperate, active, industrious, and chaste

Nothing is more remarkable than their self-dependence, arising from the early and active use of the mental faculties ; for, without education, the Greeks have decidedly more intelligence—more *savoir faire*, than any of the eastern nations. They have little conscientiousness, but much cunning ; and are deceitful, and very greedy of gain, though not avaricious ; for they spend liberally and cheerfully.

Such are the general characteristics of the race ; now for the orders : the commercial Greeks, the valets, the interpreters, the floating population of the Levant, are, in general, cunning, deceitful, fawning and unprincipled knaves ; the peasantry are industrious, provident, temperate, chaste and hospitable ; the mountaineers are gay, hardy, honest, independent and brave. We know that it is the fashion for travellers to deny the courage of the Greeks ; but we know, too, that the Turks, the old masters of the country, considered the Armatoli of the North, the Suliotes, the Mainotes of the Peloponessus, and the Sphaciotes of Candia, as the bravest and most redoubtable men in their wide domain : they never fairly subdued them, but employed them as partizan warriors. We have ourselves witnessed among them many instances of daring, that would be called fool-hardiness among Britons and Americans.

With regard to the question whether the Greeks are or are not fit to exercise the right of freemen, it will be answered differently by different persons. We are not among those who suppose the test of a people's capacity for self-government is the amount

of knowledge they possess; the Germans, for instance, are called a well-educated people, and yet we hesitate not to say that the Greeks are better fitted for self-government than the inhabitants of the south of Germany; and for this very simple reason, they are capable of individual self-government; and, politically, they have been accustomed to considerable exercise of the rights of citizens. This may seem strange, but it will appear clear to those who understand the internal affairs of Greece.

Again, we do not acquiesce in the common doctrine that a despotic government is the best for an ignorant and degraded people; we hold that the dangers to any country and to any race, in the long run, are infinitely less from the excesses of a people drunk with freedom, than from the selfishness and wickedness of tyrants, who would keep them grovelling in ignorance and vice for the security of their own institutions.

We say, better for a people, is instability and change—better is error and misrule, aye! better is anarchy and revolution, with all their attendant storms of passion, than the dull lethargy which it is ever the aim of despotism to produce. We believe firmly in the tendency of man to amelioration; we trust fearlessly to the natural superiority of the moral sentiments, and if men and nations can be kept in action, they will finally triumph.

But the question of the capacity of a people for political self-government, should be decided, we hold, on the same grounds that we should decide the ca-

capacity of a person for individual self-government: if his animal propensities are so strong that he cannot submit to moral restraint, or if his intellect is so weak that he cannot see the necessity of restraining and guiding his actions by the moral sentiments, then he is not fit to rule himself, much less to govern others.

Tried by this test, and compared with other nations, the Greeks will be found to merit a considerable degree of freedom: their intellectual capacity ever has been, and still is, of the highest order; their elasticity of spirit is unbroken; the Greek is never blood-thirsty, never gluttonous, never drunk; he is temperate in all but joy and grief; and the vices that disgrace his character, are those produced by oppression and degradation.

We have said that the Greeks have always been accustomed to exercise political rights; we refer to their municipal and sectional governments, which were, from selfish but sound policy, undisturbed by the Turks. But this subject will be found explained in the following work, which we hasten to introduce, and which, we hesitate not to say, is the most profound and valuable work that has been printed on Greek affairs for many years; we do not however expect that it will interest the public generally; for, to read it with profit and pleasure, one must have been conversant with the political changes which have taken place in Greece since the revolution. Those changes, or at least their causes, are not generally known; but still, Greece has in this country many warm friends, many who will be glad to read any thing on which they can

rely respecting her present situation: to them the work is recommended, with the strongest conviction that they will find in it sufficient proofs that they have not extended their enthusiasm and friendship to a people unworthy their regard.

S. G. HOWE.

BOSTON, JANUARY 9, 1837.

P R E F A C E .

A LONG residence in the East, and long intercourse with the Greeks, have created in the mind of the writer of this pamphlet, a strong interest in the fate of the Greek people, and a deep conviction of the existence of great latent energies in their national character. The present state of the Turkish Empire, and the creation of the Hellenic Kingdom, have now given a certain degree of political importance to the whole Greek nation, and awakened a hope, in the breasts of all those who speak the Greek language, of being one day united under the same laws, institutions and government. Feeling persuaded, that very much is yet to be learnt concerning the Greek people, before their progress can be well understood, or efficiently aided; and seeing, that very inaccurate ideas of the mental capabilities and moral qualities of the nation are prevalent, the writer ventures on the publication of these observations, with the hope of giving the

public more accurate impressions than those generally entertained, or of inducing some other writer, better able to illustrate the subject than himself, to take up the pen. As his object is strict accuracy, he begs that his attempt may be judged, rather by its truth, than by its style.

Since he may be considered as stepping forward as the advocate of the Greeks, he is anxious to disclaim all intention of being the enemy of the Turks. He feels indeed the strongest detestation of their government; regarding its existence as inseparable from the perpetration of evil, and the debasement of the moral feelings of its subjects. Still, he doubts not, that where a people possesses a distinct national character, there exist, in the very causes of that peculiar nationality, the means of calling into action a mass of virtue. Now, as the Turks have for ages had a peculiar national character, perpetuated and preserved by a distinct language, there can be little doubt, that if they possessed a sound political organization, the good features of human nature would soon predominate over the bad, even in their public administration, which is now the chief seat of national corruption. The official Turk is generally false, tyrannical and bloody; but those who have

been intimately acquainted with private individuals of the better classes of society, agree in declaring them to be just, humane and honorable, while the national courage in every rank of society is undeniable.

The crime, therefore, of its own suicide, must rest with the Turkish Government; but the defects of the social system of Turkey, which must soon cause a dissolution of the empire, are inherent in the circumstances of the people who inhabit these countries. Could each separate race of the population of this extensive realm be divided from the rest, by some all-powerful fiat, and those who speak a peculiar language, or are amalgamated by a similarity of usages, institutions and religion be entirely kept apart by geographical boundaries—then, perhaps, it would not be a hopeless task to attempt the political improvement of the Turkish Empire, by some systematic combinations. As any such wild speculation is, however, not likely to be realized, and as the Greek, Turk, Arnaout, Servian, Armenian, Curd, Arab and Drussee, are likely to remain for ages mingled together in different parts of the Ottoman Empire, it is probable that the shifts of diplomatic convenience will have a more direct influ-

ence on the fate of the provinces and people of the Turkish Empire, than any considerations relating to the feelings and prospects of its population.

From this general indifference, however, the Greek nation has already secured an exemption. A part of its population has already entered the European republic, as an independent state, and the existence of the Hellenic Kingdom is deeply connected with the political schemes of diplomacy in the East. That part of the Greek nation which has secured its independence, must exert so powerful an influence on the millions of which the whole people is composed, that their feelings can no longer be neglected in any arrangements concerning their ultimate fate, if it be expected that such arrangements are to be permanent. The object, therefore, of these observations is to present a faithful account of the leading features of the present moral and political condition of the inhabitants of the Hellenic Kingdom, and to examine the means by which they are likely to exert a permanent and beneficial moral influence, on the condition of their countrymen, who are yet subjects of the Turkish and Russian Empires.

Athens, July 25, 1836.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the present state of the East, when the important problem of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent fate of its mighty relics both engages and alarms the statesmen of Western Europe, the affairs of the Greek nation must gradually force themselves on the attention of the public. Nearly five millions of souls speak the Hellenic language, and are closely united together by a community of feelings, institutions, literature and religion, which has been powerful enough, during the vicissitudes of two thousand years, to preserve their distinct nationality, even though it has been lost by different races of their conquerors. The fate of the new Hellenic Kingdom, which the alliance of England, France and Russia have founded, while it will, if the new state be well administered, exercise an extensive influence on this powerful body, must also be liable to be affected, and perhaps at times directed by national feelings, having their origin beyond the limits of the kingdom. The fortunes of Greece, and the fate of the Greeks are not confined to that famous spot of earth, celebrated for the number of its independent republics in ancient times, and for the smallness of its independent kingdom in modern;

and if the incapacity of foreign law-givers succeeds for a time in arresting the progress of native talent in this spot, other places will be found free from the inconvenience of these restrictions, where the political and intellectual fever now circulating in the veins of the nation will display itself with additional force. Many artisans and shepherds have already emigrated from liberated Greece at the moment her rulers are inviting immigration. The same measures which produce these emigrations may induce the learned and the wealthy to follow the example, and Russia and Turkey would both offer them a distinguished reception ; while in the latter it would not be difficult for them to exert a powerful moral influence over their countrymen, an influence not likely to prove very favorable to the system or the country which had driven them to this measure.

As there can now be little doubt, in the minds of those who have paid attention to the affairs of the East, that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire must very soon take place, in spite of the forbearance which the armed force of England and France imposes on Russia and Egypt, it becomes probable, nay, almost certain, that the most influential political body which will replace the European part of the Turkish empire must be composed of the Greek nation. Their numbers and their superiority in knowledge to the rest of the inhabitants of these countries, will secure them this fortune, by whatever arrangements or under whatever modifications diplomacy may find itself compelled to carry this result into execution.

The immense importance of the establishment of a national system of administration in the Hellenic Kingdom must hence be apparent. Without such a system, no good moral influence can be exerted over the national mind, nor can the people be prepared for availing themselves in a worthy manner of any favorable changes in their condition. Unless a just and national system of Government be established in the new state, the numerous and wealthy Greeks at present residing in Russia, Austria, and Turkey, will be more inclined to direct their attention to the formation of an independent mercantile community under the guarantee of these three powers, than risk their fortunes and happiness, to share the independent political lot of their poor, over-taxed, and oppressed countrymen.

The terrible effects of the Greek revolution, and the barbarous conduct of the Turkish Government during its continuance, have for the present collected all the Greeks of talent and influence, of whatever province, in the liberated state. The Hellenic Kingdom possesses, from this circumstance, at the present time, an extraordinary power of directing the improvement of the political, moral and religious state of the whole nation. The knowledge that all the literary men of talent and the most respected of the Greek clergy are now citizens of Greece, keeps the eyes of the Greek population of Turkey directed for example and instruction to the new kingdom, and will continue to do so as long as the stirring events of the revolutionary war are fresh in their minds. But what permanent influence can a population of

650,000 souls, in a corner of the Archipelago, hope to exert over the four millions of Greeks who are scattered over Europe and Asia, unless that influence be based on the example of a national system of Government, a popular literature, and superior religious instruction.

Now, as the present administration of Greece is not yet settled on any consistent national system, but a foreign prime minister, with the advice of the diplomatic agents of the protecting powers, still directs with absolute power the whole of the public business according to temporary exigencies, liberated Greece is rapidly approaching the critical moment when it will be decided, whether she is to stop short in her career, and sit down, the poorest, and proportionally the heaviest taxed country in Europe; or whether, by the cultivation of her national institutions, by the application of the principle of publicity and the control of public opinion to her internal organization and the strictest economy to her financial affairs, the Hellenic Kingdom is to serve as the model on which the Greek nation will rebuild the fabric of their political society. By establishing a strict administration of justice, complete security of private property, and a sound system of civil and religious education based on national institutions, the Hellenic Kingdom has it in its power to do more for the civilization of the East and for the consolidation of a moral power beyond the influence of Russian control, than all the fleets and armies of England and France can ever achieve.

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THE
HELLENIC KINGDOM
AND
THE GREEK NATION.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

THREE years and a half have now elapsed since the Government of Greece has been entirely entrusted to foreign statesmen. Three years and a half ago, a numerous body of Bavarian troops, infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers, arrived in Greece, flushed with all the fervor of military enthusiasm. Bands of irregular and lawless soldiery, a half-clad people suffering under the pressure of famine, and a country every where laid waste, in which a tree or a cottage were no where to be seen, offered certainly no very inviting prospect to the new rulers. Had the Regency* consisted of men more experienced

* The Regency which acted for H. M. King Otho, during his minority, was composed of three members. Count Armansperg,

in practical affairs, its members would have felt that their foreign troops were too numerous, and much too expensive for a permanent royal guard ; and that they were not numerous enough, nor sufficiently experienced, to be of any use as a conquering army. The glittering arms of these fine troops, and the golden prospects of the high pay secured by the funds which the allied powers had placed at the disposition of the Regency, and which they generally lavished on their countrymen, removed the sombre coloring which the future might otherwise have offered.* Nothing was heard at Nauplia but the sounds of rejoicing. The Greek people, delighted with the hopes of tranquillity, and regarding the presence of their king as a guarantee for all the advantages of an European Government, hailed his arrival with the

a Bavarian Minister of Finance, who was supposed to have aided the present King of Bavaria in that admirable system of financial reforms, which has enabled him to spend more money in public works, than any sovereign in Europe. Mr. Mawrer, who had acquired a high reputation as Professor of Law ; and General Heideck, who is a man of taste, and an excellent painter. Not one of them understood a word of Greek.

* The Bavarian troops received higher pay than the Greek. Bavarian Captains, and we believe even Lieutenants were advanced to the rank of Lt. Colonels, and Colonels, while Greek officers and Philhellenes, who had served the whole revolution, were reduced from Colonels to Captains. The Bavarian officers received also larger allowances than the Greek. This was the first cause of the complaints of the Greeks and Philhellenes against what was called the Bavarian System in the army. Things have now so much changed, that the irregular Albanians are in as much favor to-day, as the Bavarians were three years ago. Is either system national ?

sincerest joy. The Regency received the homage of the nation with assurances of protection, defence and civilization. In a few days Greeks and Bavarians mingled together in public festivities, and perfect unity of purpose seemed to pervade Greece. Promises and prophecies were loudly made concerning the progress which Greece was soon to make in arts and arms. The genius of Hellas, aided by Teutonic judgment, was expected to create a new era; and already visions of another Greek empire, and projects for colonizing the East from the banks of the Iser, floated in the imaginations of the statesmen who composed or surrounded the Regency.

Such was the state of Nauplia in the early days of Count Armansperg's presidency. Let it be compared with the result, now that he is Arch-chancellor, after two years at least, of as absolute power as generally falls to the lot of a Grand Vizier. What progress has Greece yet made in commerce, civil and military organization, and public security? What has the much vaunted Teutonic judgment done for the improvement of Greece? Where are now the visions of the new Bavaro-Greek empire, and where the long-cherished project of a German America blooming in the Levant?

It is true that Greece, during the intermediate period, has been gradually rising from her ruins, the people are settling down to agricultural occupations, new houses are every where building, land is rapidly reclaimed, and vineyards are, in some favored districts, climbing the sides of the rugged hills. The Greek is

again, as formerly, heard singing, and seen dancing after the labors of the day. Does he not then acknowledge that he owes this amelioration of his circumstances to the gay strangers who landed in the Peloponnesus with their glittering helmets, some three years and a half ago? The writer has often asked this question, and he has invariably received for answer a short negative. "No, we owe it to the presence of our king, and to the protection of the Allied Powers," is almost invariably the reply. So just are the observations of the Greeks on the real situation of their public affairs. We believe that our readers will see, in the course of these observations, that the Greeks are perfectly right, and that their progress has been in spite of an anti-national system of civil administration, and a total want of system in a series of blundering military, legislative and financial measures.

During the first days of the Regency, every thing was decided by rules and prejudices imported from Germany; and the object of the Government appeared to be to assimilate Greece to Bavaria in the shortest possible time. That scheme having failed, the object of the present day seems to be to render it as unlike what it had become in the late attempt as possible. The inconsiderate conduct of Mr. Mawrer, during the period he possessed the direction of the Regency, the failure of General Heideck's war with Maina, and his measures to form a foreign mercenary army in Greece, overthrew the moral respect paid to the Bavarians on their arrival. While

the necessary consequence of Count Armansperg's neglect of all military system in forming an army, was to compel him to entrust the suppression of the late rebellion in Acarnania, to bands of irregular soldiery, enrolled for the occasion by the Greek chiefs, whom General Heideck's persecution had rendered the opponents of any organised military system.

The truth is, there never were two people between whom less real sympathy can exist, than between the Germans and the Greeks. The highest German functionaries in the kingdom have never appeared to take any interest in the internal amelioration of the country, nor, though some of them have received salaries equal to the incomes of the ten wealthiest Greek subjects united, have they ever expended one dollar on the improvement of the country from which they have drawn this exorbitant pay. Not one of the Bavarians has planted a tree or a vineyard, though many of the other foreigners of inferior incomes, English, Americans, French, Russians and Italians, have contributed considerably to the ornament and improvement of the cities of Greece which they have inhabited. The English do not owe less to the Dutch who accompanied William III., or to the Hanoverians who attended George I. to London, than the Greeks do to the Bavarians who have accompanied King Otho. If Greece, therefore, is to form an independent state, and if King Otho is to rule a happy and flourishing people, it must be by the exertions of the Greeks themselves. Greece must rise or fall

by the national institutions, and national character of the people. Its government, good or bad, must be such as they themselves can administer, suitable to their wants, and capable of being carried into execution by their means.

Before proceeding to our observations on the national institutions and character of the people, and the form of the general internal administration of government to which these naturally lead, we conceive it necessary to give a slight sketch of the most remarkable of the social features of the Greek population, prior to the establishment of the Hellenic Kingdom.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE STATE OF THE GREEK POPULATION PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HELLENIC KINGDOM.

It is certainly impossible to give an accurate view of the state of a people, without possessing a just estimate of their national character. It has ever been considered difficult to form an accurate estimate of the Greek character ; and, in this sketch, it is not expected to accomplish that which natives themselves own to be a hard task. We shall only endeavor to state what appears to be the prominent features of the people, and what exerts a peculiar influence on their condition. These features appear to us extremely different from those generally selected as characteristic of the nation, in Western Europe.

No race of men can carry with them a more distinct identity of character than the Greeks. In all the varied circumstances of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, whether as crowned slaves on the thrones of Wallachia, or as starving warriors on the mountains of Maina, a certain similarity of national character stamps them as Greeks. The first feature which makes an impression on strangers, is

the rapidity with which the Greek of every station combines and classes his ideas, and refers all his actions to the guidance of his mental faculties, whether his mental inclinations be virtuous or vicious. The vices, however, of the Greeks, drawn into relief by circumstances, have rendered their character an unpopular one; and, as usually happens with all unpopular characters, a number of new vices have been most unfoundedly attributed to it; and even some of its virtues have been decried as vices. Many of these ascribed vices are the mere modification of circumstances, and by no means inherent features in the national character, from which they would quickly vanish, if a better destiny were open to the people. The extreme difficulty of portraying at full length the Greek character, must be immediately felt by any one who reflects on the varied fate of the different portions of this singular people. Let us examine the most common accusation current against the Greeks in the seaports of the Mediterranean. The dealers in furs, generally describe the Greeks as a race of the rankest cowards. Nay, the whole Frank* population of the Levant unite at least in this accusation. Yet, amidst all the warlike tribes who march to battle under the eye of the predestinated Turk, the Roumeliot Greek has ever enjoyed the very

* The Franks of the Levant are the descendants of European parents, who have lost the national distinctions of Europe without assimilating with the natives of the East. They form a numerous body in the chief commercial towns, and entertain their own peculiar ideas and prejudices.

highest reputation for valor. His services are sought for by the Pashas of Europe and Asia, and he is mingled with the Arnaut as his equal in courage. What, but a respect for the courage, and a confidence in the fidelity of the Greek Armatoli, could have induced the Turks to preserve these Christian militia for nearly four centuries? Surely, on this subject, few will be inclined to doubt whether the opinion of the Turkish officers or the Frank merchants is best entitled to credit. The truth is, that the falsity of the Fanariot statesmen, and the meanness of the rajah traders, are not more proverbial in the East, than the frankness and courage of the Roumeliots, or the pride and honesty of the Hydriots. The naval islanders, the Mainotes, Suliots and Roumeliat population are all constitutionally brave, and habitually warlike. Indeed, the little kingdom of Greece can boast, in proportion to its population, not too small, but far too large a number of active and daring soldiers, inferior in every warlike quality except discipline, to no troops in Europe, and in many of the qualities of the soldier superior to almost all others. We make this assertion with the full conviction that several European officers who have served with the Greek troops, will readily vouch for its accuracy.*

Let us not suppose, however, that the debased character and unsettled principles of the Fanariots,

* Three years' service in the Greek army, and an intimate acquaintance with many European officers, who served there during the revolution, enable us to confirm this statement.—AM. ED.

the turbulence of the Roumeliots, and the intriguing spirit of the Moreat Primates* embrace all the prominent phases of Greek character ; and that, as some say, the Greek is incapable of tranquillity and steady domestic industry. The contrary appears from experience to be the real case. From the occupation of the most flourishing part of the Greek population, it may be inferred that the natural bias of their character is not so much inclined either to war or commerce, as to rural occupations and agriculture. It has been remarked, by all travellers, that no rural population in Europe has ever arrived at a higher degree of civil organization, arranged their local governments better, or displayed more energy and judgment in the conduct of their municipal concerns, than the Greeks. Without running over a long catalogue of names, we may refer to the state of many of the Greek islands, to the population in the mountains of Thessaly and lower Macedonia, to Talanta, Livadia, and several districts in the Morea, prior to the revolution, and to several communities of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire at the present day. Every village in which there was no resident Turk, if the property of the soil belonged to the inhabitants, invariably presented a happy and industrious aspect. The people were employed about their own private affairs, and in order to transact the public business of the village, they elected one or more of their most experienced and

* The Primates were the heads of the rich families; the land proprietors, who formed an aristocracy, resembling that of the feudal system.—AM. ED.

respectable fellow-citizens to act as chief magistrates. To these magistrates, called Demogerontes, were united the parish priest, and to them was entrusted the whole civil and police jurisdiction. Even the collection of the public taxes was generally transacted by these means, and the amount was thus remitted to the Turkish authorities, without that oppression which usually marked the direct communication of Turks and Greeks. Much of that strong spirit of nationality, which has ever formed a leading feature in the Greek character, and has enabled the people to transmit to the present generation some of the institutions and usages, as well as the language, of the ancient republics, is to be ascribed to this system of local governments.

Before we say any thing more concerning the institutions of Greece, let us conclude our desultory observations on the national character of its natives. The most prominent features in the character of the Greek, under every varied change in his lot, are, we think, activity of mind, general intelligence and aptitude to comprehend and receive the mental impressions of others, inquisitiveness, and a love of knowledge joined to strong desire for personal independence and equality. These feelings, we think, may be traced in all the provinces where the Greek language is spoken, and seem constantly to have exerted their influence on the nation. We do not pretend to deny, that many of these feelings may, and that some are, often misled to evil, but still we doubt not, that every candid inquirer will be

convinced, that, possessing these feelings, the Greek must have a national character capable of leading him to the highest pitch of mental improvement, and the power of so modelling his institutions, that he will not only insure his moral progress where he has already gained political independence, but must obtain also the amelioration of his moral and social condition, even where he remains subjected to a foreign yoke.

✓ In considering the condition of the Greeks at the period of the establishment of the present monarchy, it must be recollected that the war of the revolution had reduced the surviving population to a state of the most complete destitution. All agricultural stock was extirpated,* horses, barns, and stables were destroyed, fruit-trees and vineyards rooted up, the very forests, from which the dwellings might have been reconstructed, were every where burnt down, lest they should afford shelter to the unsubdued population. The sword, famine and disease, had reduced the inhabitants of the continent and the Morea to about one third of their original number. We believe there has been no war in modern

* The destruction of agricultural cattle was so complete, that Professor Thiersch, in his excellent work (*de l'état actuel de la Grèce, et des moyens d'arriver à sa restauration*, vol. ii. p. 2—) proposed to import into Greece 10,000 pair of oxen, the year of the Regency's arrival, and 100,000 the year after. Such gigantic measures caused his work to be very unjustly ridiculed, even by his own countrymen. The work, with all its enthusiasm and exaggeration, contains more truth than any other we have seen on Greece; and, after all, the Professor was right in the main; "Greece," as a member of the corps diplomatique, said, "had more need of *boeufs* than *Bavarois*."

times in which an equal loss of property and life has been sustained by any people which, amidst this suffering, has remained unsubdued. From the commencement of 1821 to the end of 1832, Greece had been deprived of every internal resource. Her commerce, on which a population of at least 250,000 souls was directly dependent for subsistence, was completely annihilated.* The commercial navy, which had formerly not only maintained all this multitude, but likewise added annually to the national capital, suddenly became a drain on former savings; for the whole revenue of the Archipelago did not suffice to pay and provision the fleet for six months, without providing any fund for purchasing stores and ammunition, or for the necessary repairs of the vessels, all which had to be furnished from the former savings of the proprietor of the ship.† The armed population on the continent amounted

* In Gordon's History of the Greek Revolution, (Vol. 1, p. 160,) a work of the most scrupulous accuracy, we find the marine of the islands of Hydra, Spezzia and Psara, alone estimated at 240 sail, from 325 to 600 tons. Kasos, Galaxidhi, and many other places, possessed a number of smaller brigs and schooners. The Greek Kingdom has not now half the number of vessels Greece then had, and probably not one quarter the tonnage.

† The manner in which several of the leading families of Hydra fulfilled this duty, is proved by the diminution of their fortunes. The Condouriottis, the Tombazis, Miaoulis, Vasili, Boudouri, Tzamaddoff and Boulgari, have all employed very large sums in the service of their country in this way. Some leading families are reduced to poverty, and suicide has lately, in three instances, been the shelter from starvation.

at times to 50,000 men, and as the labor of most of these was withdrawn from agriculture, this immense body had also to be maintained, in great part, from the accumulated capital of the country. In the mean time, all the richest plains remained uncultivated, from being the seats of war. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that a few years should have sufficed to consume the whole native resources of Greece. The flocks and cattle were all consumed for the support of the soldiery, and the shepherds became bands of soldiers, in order that they might eat their own sheep; and when their flocks were consumed, what could they become but bands of robbers? Even with the immense supplies which Greece received from the Philhellenic committees of Europe and America, the revolution seemed not unfrequently to be in some danger of extinction from the starvation of the whole population. Without the Philhellenic supplies, the English loans, and the long series of payments made by France to Capodistrias, the whole population of the continent must have, in the end, emigrated; for from the year 1821 to 1832, Greece imported several months' subsistence every year, and foreign grain and provisions to the value of at least £800,000, for which she had no produce to offer in return, and thousands of individuals in Greece have passed weeks without tasting bread, living on herbs. The extreme difficulty of finding nourishment for the soldiers, soon became one of the greatest sources of the internal disorders which afflicted the country during the war. When

the greater part of Greece was exhausted, the leaders of the troops were compelled either to dispute the possession of those provinces which still offered some resources, or, by yielding their possession to others, confess their military reputation and power inferior to that of their fortunate rival, and disband their troops. Emulation once roused, the civil war for the maintenance of the troops was soon carried on with as much vigor and animosity as the war with the Turks. After civil war had commenced, it was not at all unnatural that combinations of chiefs, formed to seize or secure the possession of particular provinces, should attempt to make their tenure more permanent, by striving to render themselves masters of the reins of government, and thus become the dispensers of the supplies which arrived, in a constant stream, from the excited feelings of Europe. Let not the unreflecting fancy, as we have often heard asserted, that these very supplies were the real cause of the civil war, or even suppose that they did not tend very considerably to alleviate the miseries of Greece.

We cannot here pass unnoticed the hackneyed assertion, that the strongest point of resemblance between the modern and ancient Greeks, is their love of civil war and faction. We shall therefore venture a few words in defence of both the ancient and the modern Greeks. The ancient Greek republics were, in spite of their diminutive size, as much independent states, and had as good a right of appealing to club law, as any modern kingdom in Eu-

rope, and probably did so generally, on quite as legitimate causes of quarrel. Sparta was certainly as much justified by the principles of political wisdom in striving to establish oligarchy throughout Greece, as Russia is in now striving to uphold absolute monarchy throughout the civilized world. Athens consulted her true interest as much in opposing Sparta, and extending her democratic propagan-da, as England does hers in opposing Russia, and supporting the principles of constitutional liberty. Nor are the historical results of a comparison with ancient Greece more favorable to the critics. Athens was indeed far smaller than Great Britain in extent of territory, less numerous in population, and poorer in wealth; yet, in arts, literature and all intellectual glory, she does not suffer by a comparison. The Macedonian state was smaller than the kingdom of France, before each engaged in that career of conquest which flattered them with universal empire. In courage, and in military skill and conduct, the Macedonians do not appear to have been inferior to the French; while in the success of their undertakings, and the permanency of their conquests, they have a great advantage over their modern rivals.

But with regard to that division into factions, which so strongly marked the internal organization of the Greek states, and which has been supposed to impel the moderns to civil war by an hereditary instinct, we can only observe, that we are much more inclined to blame the ancient Greeks for their abuse of power, when obtained, than for their formation of

parties to obtain it. We see everywhere that party spirit is inseparable from the expression of that difference of opinion which is the natural consequence and the surest guarantee of a free government; and that what is called faction, is most prominent in the most enlightened and civilized countries and periods. That the parties in the Greek republics abused success, is perhaps rather to be attributed to the imperfect political institutions of their states, which compelled them to nourish fierceness of manners as a defence against despotism. Perhaps we ourselves, in some very recent occurrences at home, owe our tranquillity more to the power of our political organization and the influence of our manners, than either to the personal moderation or want of factious feelings in our political leaders.

Various moral and political causes produced the wars and factions of the ancient Greeks; totally different causes produce those of the modern; but it is doubtless far easier to say, with Lord Byron's French Athenian, "Sir, they are the same *canaille* that existed in the days of Themistocles," and that, as the descendants of the ancients, they are impelled to faction and civil war by a natural instinct, than to inquire into the causes of these civil wars and factions, however simple and apparent they may be.

We believe that the fact of the Greek troops being compelled to consume more than the annual produce of the country, and the natural instinct of armed men to help themselves, is quite sufficient to explain the commencement of the civil wars in modern

Greece; and we believe the circumstances in which the country was placed, sufficiently explain the permanence of the dissensions which ensued, without seeking for any marked tendency to these vices in the national character. Can it be regarded as anything remarkable that Hydriots, Speziots, Psariots, Cretans, Samiots, Suliots, Romeliots and Peloponnesians, should act as separate tribes, and attack one another to secure the means of existence, when suffering under the pressure of famine, and allured by the hope of comparative wealth and power? Is it peculiar to modern Greece, that unprincipled politicians should strive to excite the turbulence of soldiers in order to serve their own personal intrigues? or, is it in the Greek revolution for the first time that national resources and public wealth have been squandered for party purposes? Let it not then be made an especial reproach to the Greek revolution, that it is deeply stained with domestic strife; but let the critic, who will not examine the causes of these vices, point out where the sword has ever been drawn, in the holiest cause, without all the worst feelings of human nature, as well as the noblest, displaying themselves in the struggle, and finding the means of augmenting the misfortunes and rousing the passions of mankind; and let him reflect that no Greek, in all their civil wars, even when unsuccessful, ever called in the aid of the national enemy. We hope, as we proceed, we shall be able to show, that there are circumstances in the present state of the country which render it more than

probable that the people will now seek far other occupations than war, at home or abroad, if the measures of their rulers permit them. We do not indeed hesitate to say, that if the "disinterested passion for blows," which so strongly characterized the ancient Greeks, were to be a leading feature in the modern Greek character, we should abandon all hope of ever seeing any rational civilization introduced into liberated Greece.

During the state of destitution which prevailed in Greece, from the breaking out of the war until the arrival of King Otho, there were two periods of comparative tranquillity, which strongly marked the elasticity and enterprize of the Greek character, and which prove the truth of the assertion, that there is in the country a very marked attachment to the quiet pursuits of rural industry. In the Morea, the year 1823 was one of comparative tranquillity, and it was supposed that more land was cultivated during that year, with the war raging around, than had been cultivated for some years prior to the revolution. The next period of tranquillity was that which ensued during the presidency of Count Capodistrias. Then, although no arrangements were adopted for facilitating the employment of capital in property, although no sales of building ground took place, and although the farmers could neither purchase dwelling-houses, gardens nor vineyards, nor obtain leases, for a term of years, of the land they cultivated, while the internal trade, from one port to another, remained subject to a duty of six per cent. ;

still many* houses were built, gardens and vineyards planted, and much national land was brought under cultivation in every part of the country, without any guarantee having been obtained, by the cultivators, to secure the permanent enjoyment of the fruits of their labors. Indeed Capodistrias, during the first two years of his government, before he placed his policy in direct opposition to the feelings of the nation, maintained a degree of order in the public administration, which was rapidly gaining confidence, and inducing considerable capital to be devoted to agricultural improvements.

The circumstance of greater order having existed in Greece during the presidency of Count Capodistrias, than at any other period of the revolution, has been the cause of the feeling of respect which seems generally entertained for his talents in Europe. That he was really very far superior in talents to any of the statesmen who have succeeded him, there can be no doubt; but as his talents were those of a man exercised in the combinations of circumstances and the exposition of measures, not those of one habituated to examine general principles, or connect the execution of isolated measures with a general system of administration, we have very great doubts whether he ought to derive more credit for the temporary improvement of Greece during his

* At Vrachori alone, 300 houses were built on national property, and Government has never had the good sense to grant the ground, on which the houses stand, to the builders. This populous place allowed a band of fifty rebels to occupy it in spring.

early administration, than Charles X., who furnished him with the money, which, by paying the troops, secured the absence of disorder. Neither Capodistrias nor his successors in power, to the present day, have ever felt that the government of a new country, and especially the government of a country by foreigners, in order to be in harmony with its subjects, must submit its measures to the test of public opinion, and learn from this source the modifications which may be suitable to the exigencies of actual circumstances.

The general government of a new country, where the bonds of social union are slightly tied, must attempt as little as possible to command the people ; for it should never once allow them to know, which may be easily learnt, that it may command without the power of enforcing obedience. In all the details of administration it must study existing usages and habits, where they dawn into incipient institutions ; and, by aiding and directing them in their progress, it must seek to secure the execution of its wishes without compromising its authority. If it be impossible, as may sometimes be the case, to prevent the people going wrong, government had better, by a judicious modification of the evils resulting from the error, gradually seek to enlighten the people, than, by opposing the torrent, run the danger of creating disorders more dangerous than the evils it would avoid. The truth indeed is, that, in three times out of four, the people, in cases of internal administration, are more likely to be right than the govern-

ment. A government which has not the halo of antiquity to adorn it, or the prejudices of feudality or religion in its favor, is not now likely to be regarded as anything more than an agent, whom the people have named to transact the general business of the state, as the town-councils are named to transact the business of the communities, whatever may be the modifications to which it is submitted in order to secure stability. Unless, therefore, the government of a new country act in unison with the habits and views of the nation, not only will the progress of both be arrested, but they will soon be placed in opposition, and the opinions of one must soon succumb to the power of the other. The superior knowledge of statesmen in that which is their own peculiar business, is too apt to lead them to consider their good intentions a warrant for rashly deciding in favor of their own opinions; but they ought to recollect that, as servants of the nation, they cannot know better than their employers what tends most to their employers' happiness.

We conceive that the administration of Count Capodistrias deviated too markedly from the course here signalized, to have aided much towards the permanent improvement of Greece. It was a series of unconnected measures, adopted according to a very confined and partial view of the modifications of every varying event, not based on any plan of internal organization of the nation, and not even reduced to a uniform system. It is true, Capodistrias was placed in difficult circumstances. It was

not in his power, before a treaty had been concluded with Turkey, to venture on reducing the number of the armed population; nor would it perhaps have been then prudent to adopt any general measures relating to the distribution and cultivation of the national lands, to which the military made just claims of participation. Still he had it in his power to systematize the communal organization of Greece, already in existence, and to settle the mass of exiles, from the Turkish islands and provinces, who were then wandering about the country; yet he did all he could to destroy the first, and he left the exiles to perish with hunger, or return to become industrious subjects of Turkey. The professional statesmen of the continent seem, however, in general, from the prejudices of an education amidst the strictest routine, little adapted for new or unusual conjunctures; and Oxenstierns' remark is probably as applicable to the statesmen of the present day, as it was to those of his own.* The views of Capodistrias, with regard to internal administration, seem to have been peculiarly erroneous, and his political economy and domestic policy were quite as vicious as his foreign

* England and America, the two countries where statescraft is the least studied and esteemed, are certainly the countries best furnished with statesmen. In these countries statesmen demand information, and confess their willingness to learn; but continental statesmen fancy invariably they know all things, from the establishment of a council of state, to the application of a leech. See Greek Gazette, No. 10, 1835. As Jeremy Bentham justly remarks, "it is a hard point in politics, to persuade legislators they do not understand shoemaking better than shoemakers."

politics. His only defence seems to be, that he may conscientiously have believed that Greece could only be happy and tranquil when dependent on Russia, and that the euthanasia of the revolution was the incorporation of Greece in the Empire of all the Russias. That he was at heart a Russian, and an enemy to the freedom of Greece, is the general opinion of his countrymen, who accuse him of sacrificing their future prospects to personal ambition and views of family aggrandizement. Whatever progress, therefore, the Greeks may have made during his administration, must be attributed entirely to their own energetic and enterprising character.

We shall now attempt to investigate the causes which have chiefly tended to create and perpetuate this energy in the national character. This peculiar feature of the Greek, is nowhere so conspicuous, as in the manner in which, after the most dreadful disasters, and the almost total annihilation of the resources of his country, he sets himself to work to commence a new life of industry, and by which, the moment the union of half a dozen families takes place, he lays the first foundation of civil government. It is an interesting subject of speculation to examine to what causes it is owing, that the conduct of the Greek peasant tends, by the shortest path, to the advancement of the political and social organization of his country; and to fixing, on a firm and intelligible basis, the whole relations of individuals to the general government; while the scientific measures of Counts Capodistrias and Armanberg

have all ended in total failure, and in an awkward attempt to fit European laws to a people whose usages and institutions are totally incompatible with the machinery required for the execution of these foreign regulations. Can there be a better proof that the institutions of the Greeks are more suitable for constructing a good practical system of government, than that patch-work of modern philosophy and amended feudalism which German *employés* seem to fancy the perfection of statesmanship, and which forms the cumbrous machine by which the higher classes of Germany support themselves on salaries wrung from the people, under the pretext of doing work, which, we are inclined to suspect, might in many cases, with great advantage to the community, be left undone? The institutions of a people can never be suddenly changed by legislative enactments, for they form a more important and more influential part of national existence than laws themselves. The institutions of a people give the true stamp to the national manners and the national character, and their strength will ever be attended with beneficial effects. Thus, when the institutions of France exerted so little influence on her government as to leave the manners of the court and army as the centre of national feeling, and made these the practical guarantees of ideal benefits, the seeds were sown of a revolution which destroyed the whole civil organization of the nation; while, on the other hand, as the institutions of England connected the relations of every individual with the general admin-

istration of the state, and placed the centre of national feeling in that expression of the political rights of the people called the English constitution, — an ideal guarantee of a practical good, — the perpetual means are secured of ameliorating that constitution according to every new exigency, by referring the proposed changes to the principles of these national institutions.

The effects of the peculiar institutions of the Greeks are quite as remarkable, and exercise as extensive an influence on their character, as those even of the English. No social feature is more remarkable, and perhaps none less agreeable to strangers, than a species of local patriotism, which draws a marked distinction between the immediate society of each community, and the remainder of their fellow-countrymen. The Greek rarely speaks of his nation, yet he speaks continually and with enthusiasm of his country, — an epithet which he applies to his native village, whether his birth-place be the barren mountains of Suli, the rocky islands of Hydra or Psara, or the marshes of Missolonghi; still it seems to contain for him every endearing and patriotic association which other nations find in their more enlarged signification of country.* This

* Every one who has had much intercourse with the natives of the East, at least in the Turkish Empire, must have been struck by the almost total absence of patriotic feeling, especially among the Turks themselves. No Turk, though born and bred in Europe, regards it as his country; and, if pressed by questions, he generally transports his country to Mecca, which never has, and probably

system of egotism is extended still further ; for the Greeks have generally restricted the signification of Christian, to a member of their own church, if they have not adopted it as a word to express their nationality, as distinct from other nations in Turkey.

Their common religion and language, and a similar source of oppression, whilst they separated the Greeks from their conquerors, kept them linked together by these points of friendly contact ; but it was their strong local sympathies which alone united their hearts, and which, by making every little community stand together, and feel as one man, transmitted to the present generation an uncorrupted nationality. When the nobles* of the Fanar, and the Primates of Greece had imbibed all the feelings of eastern slaves, and distinguished themselves only by subserviency to their tyrants, — selling their country to the Turks ; and, when the Turk condescended to trust them, selling him again to the highest bidder amongst the Greeks, — the uncorrupted local attachments of the peasantry bound them together, and preserved them true to themselves and to the national cause. The patriotism of the higher orders, based on feelings too general and philanthropic for the

never will be, peopled by Turks. Many provinces in Asia are inhabited by a population which regards itself stranger to the soil. Egypt and the Barbary coast is similarly circumstanced to a certain extent. Can statesmen ever remedy this moral obtuseness, or can a nation permanently exist where there is no such thing as “the dear name of country?” Without it, man becomes a locust.

* See Note I.

times, slept for centuries; while that of the lower classes, circumscribed in a narrow sphere, was cherished with as much care and yielded as much light, during the darkest ages of Greece, as it now does in the hour of dawning liberty.

Many of those Greeks who have been educated in Europe complain of the exclusive nature of their countrymen's patriotism, and the extreme bigotry of their local attachments; and the Europeans in Greece loudly re-echo the complaint. There can be no doubt that this feeling is often carried to excess, yet its beneficial effects have been so great that it hardly seems prudent to seek to check it. To it must be attributed no inconsiderable portion of that constancy which enabled so many to die of hunger rather than yield to the enemy, so long as their fellow-citizens resisted. And to this feeling must be attributed that charity, which, in so many instances, induced the Greeks to share together their last loaf. Such strong attachments may be found everywhere in the circumscribed sphere of a family: the institutions of Greece have extended these feelings to a whole village; but it may be doubted whether they are capable of a farther extension without some diminution of their force.*

* We may remark that this exclusive feeling, though it leads the Greeks to avoid amalgamation with foreigners, creates no bigotry against their usages, which they naturally expect to find different. We have been assured by the experienced, that in no country can an agricultural population be found more ready to adopt improvements than the Greek.

We believe that it is to this incredibly strong local attachment that the Greeks now owe their existence as a nation ; and the preservation of this patriotism, from the days of their former independence to the present hour, we believe they owe entirely to their system of communal administration — to their Demogerontias. The admirable effects of this system, with reference both to the civil and financial government of the Greek subjects of the Ottoman empire, have been already pointed out by Mr. Urquhart, in his able work on the resources of Turkey. So justly important does he represent this system, that he has convinced many of his readers that the sole hope of the salvation of Turkey is in the maintenance of the administration of its Rayahs ; unless, peradventure, some foreign power may think fit to run the risk of her own ruin to delay the ruin of the empire of Mahomet.*

The extreme simplicity of this system, and the fact that, while it developed public opinion, it conferred a power on the popular will which was the chief cause of its long duration, must render it wor-

* Whether the reader agrees with Mr. Urquhart or differs from him, he cannot fail to admire his profound views on the moral and political state of the East. He seems the first writer who has felt the spirit of the people and government of Turkey, and distinguished the institutions of the nation from the political government of the Sovereign. Still we do not see that Turkey can be saved by the augmenting wealth and power of her Rayahs, unless the Turks and the Sultan, in the end, adopt the religion and manners of these Rayahs, and thus create a communion of feelings and interests.

thy of the attention of the practical statesman. We have already mentioned that it consisted in the election of one or more of their own number, by the inhabitants of the villages and towns. These magistrates transacted, in the most public manner, the ordinary police, judicial and financial business of the community. In judicial affairs they were aided by the priest, and in financial business by the leading people of the place; while in all difficult cases the heads of families, assembled at their meetings before the church, formed a real *jury*. By this arrangement publicity in public affairs was ensured, and public opinion was called into operation, as a practical check on official conduct in Greece, and its beneficial effects were generally felt long before they were known or suspected in Western Europe. By this means a high degree of local information was kept alive amongst the people, and feelings of public interest were created, which for centuries prevented the Greek villagers from carrying their disputes before the Turkish tribunals. These simple Demogerontes, or elders of the people, formed a barrier against the progress of the Ottoman power; a moral barrier, which has restrained the torrent until its sources having failed, and the great lake which it had created is rapidly disappearing.

The circumstance of finding an internal administration of the rural districts organized to their hand, proved so convenient to the Turks, that they immediately availed themselves of it in their financial operations; and having once experienced the

facilities it afforded, they became its strenuous defenders, and thus secured to the Greeks the means of preserving their nationality at the very moment it seemed to be irrecoverably destroyed. The habits of the Greeks, in the executive details of their local business, are now so firmly fixed, that it is not a rash prophecy to declare, that no foreign rulers will ever govern the country who do not base the details of their administration on this institution — an institution which is now established in adamantine security in the habits and heart of every Greek, and which can only be effaced by the total demoralization or extinction of the Hellenic race.

In all countries where the system of centralization is adopted, the greatest difficulty of government is in the formation of that machinery, and of those usages and institutions amongst the people, which afford a guarantee for the stability of their conduct, and ensure their pursuing a consistent and uniform line in carrying into effect the intentions of the general government. In the most civilized countries, and with the most carefully educated agents, this difficulty is felt: how impossible must it be, then, to supply the imperfect and indefinite nature of all administrative legislation, where the distant ramifications of government come into immediate contact with the interests of a people, in a rude state of society? In a rude state of society, therefore, where the intricate combinations of law and police, arising out of the innumerable exigencies of civilization, are unknown, it is probable that no better system of

administration has yet been discovered than that of the Greek Demogerontias. Courts of justice must always be confined to questions affecting rights of property, and pecuniary transactions of a certain magnitude; and courts of police are invariably courts of corruption and tyranny, where they exist far from the control of the highest authorities. There can be little doubt that public opinion, and their own respectability, will ensure better conduct from the magistrates named by the people, than can be obtained from the doubtful knowledge and character which the miserable pittance the Greek government can afford its subordinate agents in the distant provinces can purchase from them. Who would not rather trust his cause to the honesty of a farmer, than to the science of a hired justice in a distant province? But whether this system be philosophically the best, is now of little consequence; the fact is, we find it universally established in Greece — we have two thousand years' experience of its good effects — no objection is urged against its operation, and we have it thoroughly understood by the people in all its practical details. On the other hand, the system of centralization will be very long of attaining a like perfection, under such directors as its present Bavarian and Fanariot patrons in Greece.

The present system of local administration not only embraces the details of ordinary civil business, but it is applied to all questions of agricultural affairs. All disputes concerning rights of grazing, forest laws, irrigation and fallows, are determined

according to a code of unwritten usages, the collection and publication of which would have been a task worthy of the Bavarian legists; it would have presented the only living record of the ancient republics of Greece, and would have been of more general interest, to the historian of the human race, than the laws of the Lombards or the Bavarians themselves. It is strange, indeed, that, in a country where most things that are old are treated with affected veneration, the usages and institutions of the people, though the oldest in Europe, should have been treated with neglect and even contempt; and that it should have been attempted to legislate for this people without any collection of the existing customs, or any attention to usages which experience has proved to be so admirably calculated for perpetuity. This, however, has been done; and from the year 1832, the whole system of the Greek local administration has remained unacknowledged by the general government, and it continues to exist by the will of the people alone, while numerous translations of German laws and ordinances are published in the Greek Gazette as the guides of the country. It is needless to say, that three quarters of these foreign laws are waste paper in Greece, whatever impression they make, in favor of their authors, on the German public, when they appear in the Munich and Augsburg newspapers.

It may perhaps appear surprising to many, that so simple a circumstance as the existence of popular village magistrates, should have exercised so exten-

sive an influence on the moral condition of the Greek nation. But let Englishmen reflect, that the foundations of their own liberty were laid in the tythings and hundreds of Saxon times, rather than in the Wittenagemots ; for, while the Normans overthrew all traces of the latter, the spirit of the Saxon communal administration preserved that moral strength, which, with the amelioration of society, ripened the Norman despotism into the British constitution. We fear not to say, that Greece has found her national spirit as well preserved by her Demogerontias as England had hers by her hundreds. Whether her future course may not be cheered and aided by her illustrious predecessor in the race of civil liberty, we shall not stop to conjecture.

We conceive we have now given a sufficient explanation of the peculiarities of the social organization of political society in Greece, at the conclusion of the war of the revolution. The domestic civil administration, it will be seen, presented few difficulties, and the national voice pointed out distinctly the road to be adopted. Everything combined to facilitate the task. The people were desirous of engaging in the cultivation of a rich and unappropriated soil, which was in sufficient abundance to satisfy the whole of the diminished population. Two thirds of the new kingdom being national property, the rent or the price of part of this land, was sure to put the government in possession of an amount of revenue amply sufficient for the impoverished state of the country. The commencing tranquillity, by encour-

aging industry, was daily augmenting the wages of labor, while the increased cultivation was as rapidly lowering the price of provisions. All the favorable circumstances in new countries were found united in Greece; added to which, that knowledge of the peculiar capabilities and products of the soil already existed, which long study and dear-bought experience can alone supply in other countries, where similar advantages are usually found. The very inconveniences attendant on a scanty population were not likely to be any serious bar to the rapid improvement of the country; for Turkey offered, in the immediate neighborhood, a numerous Greek population, eager to emigrate and become citizens of the new state. Capital, itself the last and most necessary requisition of civilized society, the want of which so long arrests the progress of new countries, seemed on the eve of arriving in considerable supplies, by the immigration of wealthy Greeks, and strangers from Europe, to purchase the Turkish estates for sale in Eubœa and Northern Greece.* Had the government of the country known how to profit by all these favorable circumstances, Greece might, long before the present

* Many Englishmen purchased Turkish property in Greece, or have built villas there.— Sir Pulteney Malcolm, General Gordon, Messrs. Noel, Muller, Bracebridge, Skene, Bell and Edye. Messrs. Bracebridge, Noel, Muller, and the author of this pamphlet, have purchased large landed estates; but the Greek government have thrown difficulties lately in the way of the sale of Turkish property, and it has been impossible to procure valid titles. Why, is inexplicable.

day, have made advances towards prosperity, which years must now elapse before she is likely to attain ; for one of those happy conjunctures, which so rarely return, has been allowed to escape unimproved.

CHAPTER III.

VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DIFFERENT
ADMINISTRATIONS IN GREECE, SINCE 1832.

BEFORE reviewing what advances have been made by Greece in the career of improvement, during the last three years and a half, it may perhaps tend to facilitate a correct judgment on the subject if we state what were the general wishes of the country, and what measures public opinion had pointed out as indispensable to the success of any foreign administration. We believe no government ever assumed the direction of public affairs in any country, under more favorable auspices, than the Regency of King Otho's minority. The absolute necessity, not only of a foreign Sovereign, but also of some foreign administrators, was universally felt; as every public man in the country had been tried, and all had been found wanting, in the highest offices of the state. The Sovereign who arrived, immediately gained the hearts of his subjects, by a degree of judgment, dignity and kindness remarkable at his early age, and which has never since, for one moment, forsaken him. This rare union of quali-

ties, so important in his station, have rendered King Otho one of the most popular monarchs in Europe, and his popularity has been no slight assistance to his public servants.

The members of the Regency were men of talent, who enjoyed some reputation in their respective spheres of action. The hopes of Greece were therefore justly raised to the very highest pitch. It was felt by all, that the whole general administration, as well as what is usually termed the executive power, would at first be thrown into the hands of the Regency. It would be invidious to attempt the collection of the facts on which this opinion may have rested, and it is difficult for a stranger to decide on its justice, unless he should have enjoyed some opportunities of observing the political conduct of the individuals who then figured in the highest public offices in Greece. At the same time, it was fully understood, that, however superior the members of the Regency might be in knowledge of the general principles of administration, of the organization of the public offices, and of the science of law-making, still they must be far inferior to many of the natives, in knowledge of the wants of the country, of the objects for which new laws were required, the details to which legislation would alone be applicable, and the measures by which that legislation could be advantageously carried into effect.

To supply this, it was supposed that the Regency would, immediately on its arrival, assemble a Council of State, selected from the most influential and able

men in the country ; and that they would have made this selection before personal motives or petty intrigue could in any way have warped their judgment from making the choice on general principles. That they would even have received into this Council of State a certain number of provincial members by popular election, as a means of ascertaining the extent of local feelings and prejudices, was expected by some, who founded their hopes on the supposed liberality of the opinions of the President of the Regency, the now celebrated Count Armanberg. It was thought that no step in legislation could possibly be taken by foreigners, totally ignorant of the language of the country, until this was done. A Council of State, it was said, would supply the readiest means of collecting information concerning facts ; it alone could prepare reports on the internal state of the kingdom, supported by proper evidence ; and it was shrewdly added, that the publication of these reports would afford the only guarantee the government could possess against being misled, and secure it from that unpopularity which must, more or less, attend every foreign administration.

The next great measure which was expected, was the re-establishment and public ratification of all the existing institutions of the country, and an order for the legal election of Demogerontes in all the villages and districts where no elections had lately taken place, on account of the anarchy introduced by Capodistrias' tyranny, and the subsequent civil war. This was considered the readiest way of restoring a

general and uniform administration in domestic affairs, and supplying the executive government immediately with the most efficient and experienced agents in the rural districts, which were firmly attached to the monarchy, and would aid the Regency in the execution of all its measures.

Such were the two acts which, it was expected by the liberal party, would have marked the first hours of the sojourn of the Regency in Greece. So sweet, however, appears to be the possession of absolute power to all men, that Count Armanberg, Mr. Mawrer and Mr. Abel, though all three professed liberals, agreed, amidst all their quarrels and during all their respective periods of authority, in refusing to share with the Greeks one iota of that power which the three Powers had incautiously placed in such hands. It was not until the conclusion of last year, that the nomination of a body, without even a fair deliberative power, was framed under the name of a Council of State.

We shall not enumerate the other leading measures, on which the decision of government was anxiously expected, as some time was evidently necessary to their discussion and perfection. An immediate decision, however, was loudly called for, on some questions relating to affairs connected with the fortunes of large bodies of private individuals; and as these subjects have generally a more immediate influence on national tranquillity, and often a more direct effect on national wealth, than the forms of the general administration, or the details of legal

procedure, the neglect of them at similar conjunctures is peculiarly dangerous. The following five measures might certainly, under the necessary modifications, have been adopted with great advantage to the nation :—

1. That the government should announce its intention to guarantee all the existing rights of property, honestly obtained.

2. That a distribution of a certain portion of the *uncultivated* national lands should take place, amongst those who possessed no property in Greece, according to a fixed scale of civil or military service during the revolution.

3. That an hypothetic loan fund should be established by the government, in order to lend money at a low rate of interest to those landed proprietors who had their buildings and stock destroyed during the revolution, according to a combined scale of their individual services and rank, and the extent of the mortgaged land.

4. That sales of building ground and gardens should take place in the principal towns and villages, in order to induce the permanent settlement of all resident capitalists.

5. That leases of national land in the immediate vicinity of large towns should be granted, at a public auction, to be held every three months for that purpose.

Besides the above, there were many others on which a considerable difference of opinion existed amongst the best-informed men in Greece, and on

these, Government had no resource but to order reports to be prepared by competent persons, and to submit these reports to public discussion. Of these the most important were, the state of the foreign and internal trade of the kingdom and the means to be adopted for its improvement ; the means of providing for the liquidation of the foreign and domestic debts ; the mode of indemnifying the services of those who had fought during the revolutionary war ; and the *vexata questio* of the distribution of a portion of the national lands to every Greek citizen. The Government of Greece must now, when the neglect of the examination of these subjects is producing such bitter fruits, deeply regret its former jealousy of public opinion.

Amidst public expectation of conciliatory measures, the Regency commenced its acts by an ordinance disbanding the whole of the irregular army in Greece. A measure of great energy, on the wisdom of which public opinion is still undecided. By this ordinance the whole of the irregular troops in Greece were compelled either to become citizens, to enter the regular troops, or to quit the kingdom.* Considering the prejudices which generally prevailed against regular troops as not very efficient in Greek warfare, this may be considered a hard measure to have adopted towards the constant defenders of Grecian independence. Many, however, struck by the disorders and ravages which had disgraced the civil wars

* See the ordinance itself, Greek Gazette, No. 6, March 14, 1833.

which immediately preceded the arrival of the Regency, considered the annihilation of the irregular troops as a first and indispensable step towards order and the security of property. Upon the whole, when it is considered that numerous bands of Turkish and Albanian robbers had already introduced themselves into Greece, and joined themselves with bands of the Messalian and Macedonian Armatoli, who formed independent companies, unconnected either in interest or feelings, with the inhabitants or the revolution, it cannot be concealed that some very energetic and sudden measure was necessary to expel these bands before they could unite their forces. It was, however, no easy matter to separate these from the rest of the irregulars with whom and with whose captains and parties they had become so mixed up, that any attack on the one, was sure to make enemies of both. Had the Regency, therefore, attempted to distinguish the innocent, the business would have become a matter of detail, the distinctions in its execution, and the selection of the deserving must have been entrusted to the consideration of the Greek secretaries of state, and a dangerous lapse of time would have occurred between the decision and the execution of the ultimate measure. Maurocordatos must have protected one criminal allied with his military partisans; Kollitti must have supported another, to prove his influence equal to that of his rival; and the Regency, incapable of deciding amidst conflicting evidence, would in the end have discovered that no individual in the irregular army had committed the disorders

which laid waste the greater part of Greece, in 1832. The ridiculous increase of officers which had taken place during this period of disorder had also rendered the business much too complicated to be entered into in detail, with the slightest hope of a satisfactory termination; and there can be little doubt, that as much discontent would have been caused by any other possible arrangement, as that which flowed from the energetic and effective measure adopted; while no other could have succeeded in radically curing the disease. In such a case there was no time to lose—the measure, to prove effectual, required to be done suddenly, to deprive the irregulars of the possibility of concerting common measures, or learning the sentiments of the most powerful leaders. For at that time there were ten thousand armed men in Greece, five thousand of whom were experienced soldiers, who would neither quit their arms nor adopt the habits of regular troops. It would have required more than five times the troops the Regency brought with them to Greece to have subdued these men, if they had found time to concert a common plan of operations, and to unite under an acknowledged leader. The rock of Korax, and the malaria of Thermopylæ would have sufficed to save them from the Bavarian troops. The powerful party, called the Nappists or Russo-Greeks, stood ready to aid any movement which tended to keep up excitement and prevent the country settling into tranquillity, unless under their own administration. We feel little hesitation, therefore, in saying, that the measure, though

a severe one, was necessary for the security of the monarchy in Greece, and that it is far too important and too daring an act to have been conceived by the feeble statesmen to whom accident entrusted its execution ; had the talents which conceived such a measure carried it into execution, it would not have been in the blundering way which leaves Greece at this moment, after a lapse of three years and a half, at the commencement of a series of measures to alleviate the evils resulting from the measures adopted in reference to the disbanding and enrolling the irregular troops.

In saying this, however, we are anxious to declare that the mode in which the measure was carried into execution, and the manner in which the native Greek troops were afterwards neglected by the three members of the Regency, in their respective periods of power, will always reflect disgrace on their heads and dishonor on their hearts. The moment all danger from the irregulars ceased and their force was completely broken, it became a sacred duty of the government to provide a suitable means of embodying the soldiers of the revolution in organized bands, without enforcing any change of dress or arms. Subsequent events have shown the necessity of some such measure even for the defence of the kingdom. Unfortunately the Regency became too deeply engaged in settling themselves and friends comfortably down in the high pay and great offices, suddenly opened to their ambition, to think of the permanent defence of Greece, or the gratitude due to those who

had by their valor and services saved the kingdom. A period had, however, arrived when the services of the heroes of the revolutionary war were considered as belonging to a past epoch, while hopes of a brilliant future was attached to the prospects of the heroes of 1833.

A very short time elapsed before it became apparent in Greece, that the members of the Regency were more occupied in organizing the machinery by which it was to carry on the work to be done, and in preparing decrees and ordinances which, by their publication, might secure the applause of the literary circles of Germany to their scientific details, than in investigating by what general principles remedies might be applied to the existing evils in Greece. Long instructions to Secretaries of State and Prefects were published in the government Gazette, where they remain, to this day, a dead letter, or have produced little practical effect beyond an enormous waste of paper.* Great part of these documents are no way adapted to the state of the country, and evidently

* The Greek Gazette contains the following curious ordinances. In No. 13. Instructions to the Secretary of State, for the Royal Household and Foreign Affairs. No. 14. Concerning the Department of Justice—The Interior—Public Instruction and Finance. No. 15. War and the Marine. No. 17. The organization of the system of centralization. No. 24. The establishment of a Naval Prefecture. If these laws are to be judged by the effects they have produced they are waste paper. However, we must not forget that the Greek Cabinet has never yet been composed of men who could communicate together in one language, understood by all its members.

drawn up without a single inquiry into the actual state of things. After these laborious efforts of abstract legislation, a few ornamental decrees were published, to polish and bring to perfection the external appearance of the new state—to imprint on it the most finished stamp of European civilization, and blend it harmoniously with the older Monarchies of the West. An order of knighthood was decreed, and the color and form of the uniforms of the civil servants of the government were regulated with infinitely more knowledge of professional detail than gentlemen usually possess. Ornaments were profusely heaped on the public uniforms of individuals whose every day garments probably required the aid even of a domestic tailor. Such were the measures by which three eminent German statesmen seem to have thought that a people, in whom the first principles of political freedom and religious liberty were fermenting in the difficult task of organizing the social condition, could be permanently governed—the wealth and resources of a new state improved, and a new monarchy consolidated. With these matters, the general legislation of the Regency seems to have terminated on the 18th of April, 1833, and it commenced its labors of detail.

The effects of neglecting to investigate the state of the country, were soon too apparent, in a series of troubles and misfortunes which, commencing shortly after the period we have cited, continued to embarrass the Regency until the majority of King Otho, in June, 1835. Some disturbances broke out in Tinos, the

head-quarters of the Capodistrians, which caused a long decree establishing martial law, in September, 1833. It seems probable that this must be the event alluded to by the "Spectator," in the following words: "The continental journals state that martial law has been declared throughout the kingdom of Greece; we suspect that the descendants of Leonidas are too familiar with martial law—the only law which they have lived under for centuries—to feel any constitutional scruples about obeying their young monarch's proclamation."

Shortly after this, the Regency and its Councillors, consisting chiefly of strangers and *emigrés* Greeks, were so far misled in their estimate of the state of society, and so ignorant of the power which public opinion has already acquired in the country, as to venture some attempts to circumscribe the liberty of the press. Had these regulations been really directed against abuses of publication they might have been pardoned, but it was too evident that under an affected care to guard against minor injuries individuals in office, a serious injury was wantonly inflicted on the nation. As far as government sought to restrain the freedom of political discussion, it totally failed, and Greece has still to boast of four political newspapers superior to very many continental journals, in which as great a latitude of party violence is displayed as in any country east of the channel.* Numerous schemes

* These newspapers are the *Athena*, *Sotir*, *Takhydhromos*, and *Greece regenerated*. The first is a liberal opposition paper, on the

of internal improvement followed, which had evidently reference to no practical effect farther than what could result from the eclat of their publication in the Augsburg Gazette. Amongst other projects it was decreed that seven great roads were to be formed to the uttermost ends of the kingdom; and certainly the numerous Bavarian pioneers might have been thus very usefully employed. A road from the Pirceus to Athens, of five miles, is just completed, and a road from Nauplia to Corinth is carelessly traced: such are the only results of three years labor; and at

principle of measures, not men. The second is supposed venal and entirely on the principle of men, not measures. The editor and Count Armanberg have lately had a violent personal quarrel. The Sotir says the Count promised him the portfolio of public instruction, to secure the support of his newspaper, which is published in French and Greek during the stay of the King of Bavaria in Greece, and that when the King departed he pretended difficulties in the way of completing the bargain. Not only private individuals of the highest rank were led by the Count to believe that he had decided on having the Sotir as a minister, but even the public were deceived at a fête, given either to an illustrious stranger or to the Editor of the Sotir, for the public conduct of the Count and his allies raised a doubt who was the lion. The Sotir now revenges himself by ridiculing the measures of the Count, in the most unmerciful way, and treating him with a mixture of contempt for his talents, and suspicion of his political integrity towards Greece, to which, probably, no prime minister of any country ever yet submitted. One of the remaining newspapers is ministerial, and the last is established to defend the prime minister as Chancellor, and throw the faults of the administration on the Greek Secretaries of State. Besides these there is a religious journal, by Greek priests, a military one, and two literary, which will be allowed to be a fair proportion of periodical literature, for a capital of 15,000 inhabitants.

this rate of proceeding it will require at least 275 years to finish the roads proposed.

In the mean time, though little was effectuated in Greece, for the improvement of the country, the greatest activity was displayed abroad in the expenditure of the loan, which the allied powers had placed entirely under the control of the three individuals who composed the Regency, without allowing the Greeks, either by means of a council of state or of the Greek secretaries of state, or even by public opinion, which would have followed on publicity, to offer any check to the general system of jobbing for which they are now expected to pay. The troops were recruited amongst the Bavarian burghers instead of amongst the Greek peasants—brood mares were transported from Mecklenburg, to breed mules in Greece—an entire cargo of pick-axe handles was brought, to make tools, and is now using as fire-wood—splendid military equipments were ordered in France—naval stores and steam-boats as far north as Sweden.

Fortunately for Greece, a schism took place in the Regency, and the indecent quarrels of Count Armanberg and Mr. Maurer, induced foreign interference to be called in for the preservation of decency, which might have been long neglected for the preservation of Greece. We shall not enter into the causes of this illustration that European statesmen can fight about the wealth and power of provinces with as much acrimony as the Greek capitani. Mr. Maurer, who appears to have been the best informed and

most capable man in the Regency, has published three volumes, in justification of his views, acts and policy, which prove, only, that he was an able, active, conscientious man—mistaken from what his countrymen call *one-sidedness*.* A very strong proof of the extreme unpopularity of the measures of the Regency, at this period, is the fact that Count Armansperg became extremely popular amongst the Greeks, from the mere circumstances of its being known that he was opposed to his colleagues, though the remaining period of the Regency proved that his opposition was chiefly personal, since in no one case has he altered the anti-national laws passed before he obtained power, and he continued to govern on the same exclusive principles.

On the 2d of August, 1834, the king of Bavaria recalled Mr. Maurer and Mr. Abel, the secretary and supplemental member of the Regency, a man of great talents and ambition, and replaced them by an unimportant individual, who had strict orders to secure, by his vote, a complete dictatorship to Count Armansperg. The merits of Mr. Maurer's administration can now be very justly estimated, and public opinion has calmly ratified the hostile feeling his measures

* Das griechische Volk in oeffentlicher, kirchlicher und privatrechtlicher beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheitskampfe bis zum 31 Juli, 1834. von Georg von Maurer, &c. Heidelberg 1835—3 bände. The work, however, contains much information on the real state of Greece, and shows well how difficult it is for the ablest stranger to govern a country without consulting public opinion, or knowing the language.

awakened at the time of the promulgation. The truth is, that though Mr. Maurer was a man of talent, possessing a deep knowledge of his profession, and one who devoted his whole energies to the work of building up a liberal system of legislation for Greece, yet he was a subtle lawyer, not a profound legislator. He had lived and thought too much as a German professor of law, to estimate the real value of the feelings, usages and institutions of the Greeks; and like too many of the politicians of the present day, he had fallen into the error of believing that there is a standard of law adapted to all countries and nations.

The energy and activity of his government, however, contrasts strongly, with the feebleness and lethargy which has reigned amongst his successors, whose policy has, unfortunately, not tended more than his own to advance the prosperity of Greece. The undue favor with which the Germans were treated in the army, and the gross neglect of the acknowledged talents of the Greeks in the navy, continued after his departure, and Generals Heideck and Lesuire will long be regarded as the real causes of the failure to form a regular army in Greece, by their systematic partiality and injustice. The organization of the judicial department, which Mr. Maurer himself conducted, was more judiciously arranged than any other of the foreign schemes introduced in Greece, precisely because the administration has been chiefly entrusted to Greeks. Yet, even in this department, much remains to be done before the usages

and institutions of the nation are so dovetailed into the legal system, that the people derive full advantage from their knowledge of the practice of the law which these entail, while the assimilation of these practical features to the general theory of jurisprudence is so complete as not to perplex the decisions of the judges. So great were the difficulties at first found in adapting the present judicial system to general practice, that the "Athena" declared on the 10th of October, 1835, that many of the tribunals had not then given ten decisions, and points out the absolute necessity of altering some of the existing arrangements.

Some administrative measures were attempted during the Regency of Mr. Maurer, which excited more direct opposition than his general principles of legislation. One of these, adopted at the suggestion of the celebrated Maurocordatos, then secretary of state for the Finances, illustrates admirably the feeling of the government and the state of the country. As early as the month of May, 1833, it sowed those seeds of distrust against the intentions of their rulers among the Greek people, which no subsequent measures have tended to eradicate. This occasion was seized by the factions of representing how incompatible a government which has no common feelings with the people—whether Bavarian or Fanariate—must be with the true interests of liberated Greece. The Regency, at the suggestion of Maurocordatos, (whose head, ever full of schemes, seems to have been anxious to place the Regency in such a position

that they could not have proceeded without his assistance,) thought fit to rake up an old Mahomedan law, as much at variance with the actual practice of European Turkey as with the principles of justice. With this Arabic text (evidently conceived in Arabia deserta) in his hand, he persuaded the Regency of the eastern America, which it was so eager to colonize, that all the land in Greece, not actually under cultivation, could be declared the property of the state. As minister of Finance, he issued a circular in which the following memorable words are contained:—"that every spot where wild herbs fit for the pasturage of cattle grow, is national property;" and that the Greek government, like the Sublime Porte, recognizes the principle "that no property in the soil, except the exclusive right of cultivation, can be legally vested in a private individual." * This extraordinary attempt to govern according to the legislative principles of "a horde of Asiatic barbarians encamped in Europe," and to enact a law by means of a ministerial circular was made in direct violation of the laws of Greece and the rights of private property, which even the Ottoman Government had for nearly four centuries uniformly respected. The attempt to enforce this circular, by seizing all the pasturage, created such a ferment in the country that the measure was silently withdrawn; but the suspicion that the Greek government considered itself the legal heir to

* When Maurocordatos wrote this specimen of diplomacy, in legislation, he must have forgotten Talleyrand's instructions to the young diplomat. *Et surtout, Monsieur, point de zele.*

the Sultan, and would add European and Fanariate chicane to assist their pretensions, created a general feeling of the insecurity of landed property which subsequent measures have too often tended to augment. The immediate effect of this attempt to render the state the sole proprietor of the soil, while all the population of the country were calling out for its distribution, may easily be conceived. The warlike population of Romelia, chiefly engaged in pastoral occupations, was on the eve of taking up arms, and was, indeed, only prevented by the sudden arrestation of its principal leaders.

Avarice, and the ambition of the success of playing the civil Pizarro or Cortes, easily explains the ideas of the inexperienced statesmen who thought to seize the soil of Greece; but it is to this day difficult to conjecture what motive could have induced the Regency to engage in their rash attack on the mountaineers of Maina. The pretext was an order to destroy all towers or houses which could be converted into defensive buildings. Now, as almost every house in Maina is a tower with a stone staircase communicating with a door in the second story by means of a moveable platform, this order was pretty nearly equal to an invitation to the wealthier classes in Maina to lodge in the open air. Is it to be wondered at that the Mainotes preferred defying the government to tamely submitting to be treated like wild beasts. Yet, at this very time, the Mainotes were extremely anxious to quit their barren mountains, and were desirous to settle on the uncultivated national lands, in the plain

of Messenia; and it would have been easy to have rendered them firm friends of the government, and useful subjects, instead of converting them into the destroyers of the Bavarian power in Greece. The Bavarian troops sent to put in force the decree were every where defeated, and their military reputation in the opinion of the Greeks was completely destroyed, by the manner in which many of them laid down their arms. Indeed it required the most extraordinary ignorance of the country and the people, to suppose that the small number of troops which could be sent against the Mainotes could make any impression on that numerous and warlike population, flushed with the recollection of their victories over the numbers of Ibrahim Pasha.

When the Regency in these important measures displayed such neglect of the national spirit, it is not to be supposed that their general administration was characterized by any feelings of justice towards the Greeks; and, accordingly, numerous measures daily augmented the existing discontent. Orders were at one time sent to all the principal towns in Greece to prevent the construction of houses until the plans of the respective towns should be examined and approved of by this omni-law-giving trio. We shall not weary our readers with many details. At Patras the indemnifications promised by Capodistrias in 1829, in tracing the existing town have not yet been paid, while in express violation of the conditions on which the principal street towards the sea was built, the Government had lately sold the ground between

their front and the beach as building ground. At Athens it was decided to excavate one half of the town, in order to search for antiquities, though it was calculated by a French Engineer that the expense would exceed the excavation of Pompeii. The proprietors of the houses in the district marked out for this purpose were for two years prevented from completing them, even when half finished. At length the Government, suddenly changing its mind, and without any public communication, commenced building a large barrack in the middle of the ruins of Hadrian's library, exactly in the spot where excavations were likely to be most successful, and filled up that part of the enclosure near Lord Elgin's tower with ten feet of new rubbish. The contrast of this act with the long decree in the twenty-second number of the second volume of the Greek Gazette, on the preservation of antiquities, though it may be very amusing to the people of London and Munich, is death to the poor sufferers at Athens.

In enumerating the follies of this period of the Regency, we are not unwilling to do ample justice to its merits, and do not forget that the most liberal and enlightened measure of any foreign statesmen in Greece, and which wants only a more direct adaptation to actual exigencies in the rural communes, to be the Magna Carta of Grecian liberty, was framed by Messrs. Maurer and Abel. We mean the law establishing the municipal and communal governments. This law,* which found a corresponding

* Greek Gazette, Vol. 2, No. 3, 22d January, 1834.

institution based in the usages of the country, was immediately understood and fairly appreciated by the Greeks, and will long be regarded as a proof of the real desire of its authors to establish a rational system of government and of their capacity to do so, when they could keep their minds from the alluring charms of irresponsible power. This excellent law has however been most shamefully neglected, and is not yet carried into execution, nor are all the communes formed even in the province of Attica, though the result of the system has been found most beneficial in all those communes which have been hitherto allowed to elect their own magistrates. Indeed the enlightened Greeks look more to this system for the permanent improvement of their country and for the introduction of a national system of education, than to the general government; and it is with deep regret that they see the present Chancellor allow every impediment to be thrown in the way of this law, merely because it is considered to reflect high honor on his political antagonists, and frequently calls forth a few words from the public press in their praise; which he is too apt to consider as a satire on his own neglect and indolence.

About this time, a bureau of statistics and political economy was made to figure in the newspapers, as one of the new institutions of Greece, though it had long since died a natural death. The ordinance establishing it is a curious specimen of legislation *de omni scibili*.* For instance, the Engineer officers

* Greek Gazette, Vol. 2. No. 13. date of decree 11 May, 1834; of publication 3 June. It consists of 50 articles.

of the French expedition in the Morea had completed an excellent map of the Peloponnesus, and the French Government had sent to Greece 100 copies ; yet, without any allusion to this, the decree calmly orders this expensive and difficult undertaking to be recommenced, in a country which had been unable to procure at that time a dozen plans of petty towns, and all this preparatory only to a special survey of the whole kingdom. Clauses are inserted about geology, mines, roads, internal navigation and canals.!!! The very idea of forming canals in a country where there are not five rivers, in which it is possible for children to amuse themselves by sailing boats, during the months of August and September, proves the exact knowledge of the country which was at this epoch necessary to make a legislator. The extreme breadth of the country, may be seventy-five miles, and there are at least a dozen separate mountains, whose height exceed six thousand feet.* In such a country, this decree orders it to be examined, whether it will be more economical to establish a system of canalization, or continue the construction of the roads already

* In the Morea.	Metres.	Psari	- - -	1804
Taygetus	- - 2409	Saita	- - -	1813
Cyllene	- - 2370		In Roumely.	
Khelmos	- - 2355	Ghiona	- - -	2525
Olenos	- - 2224	Vardhusi (Korax)		2500
Dourdouvana	- 2112	Parnassus	- -	2460
Maleno	- - 1958	Velouchi (Tymphrestus)		2300
Skhipieza	- - 1936	Oeta	- - -	2120
Voidhia	- - 1927	Helicon is only	-	1750
Crathis	- - 1875			

decided on. All this really puts us in mind of the story of the Queen of France, recommending the poor to eat pie-crust when bread was dear.

When Count Armand-Perceval, obtained the entire direction of public affairs, this wild system of legislation had already sowed the seeds of rebellion in the Morea. And he was so alarmed and confounded, by this very natural result of his colleagues conduct, that he abandoned, in a fit of timidity, the entire direction of the measures necessary to repress this rebellion, to Mr. Koletti, who was then secretary of state for the interior, supposing, probably, that as he from his office, must have possessed perfect knowledge of the means by which things had been conducted to this unhappy situation, he was the likeliest man to discover means of running back by the shortest road. Koletti, who is a man of talent, soon succeeded, and is said to have been viewed with no favorably eye ever since.

The immediate cause of this insurrection, was an awkward attempt to change the manner in which the tenths of the gross produce of the land are collected as a land tax. It appears to be the general opinion of all those who are unconnected with the farming of the revenues, that it will be extremely difficult, and even dangerous, to attempt any change of the Turkish system, except by the amelioration of its details, until capital is more abundant in Greece, the interest of money lower, and a readier market can be found for produce in the provinces.* It is well known that all

* Yet this has been attempted this year, 1836.

the dangers of the proposed measure were pointed out to the then Secretary of Finance in Greece ; but the young man who held that post, had no knowledge beyond what can be acquired at public lectures in the University of Leipsic. The consequences of his paying more attention to his studies in Germany, than to the practice of the world in Greece, were the devastation of part of the Morea, a direct expense of 2,000,000 of drachmas (£70,000 stg.) in the expenses of the campaign, and a loss of double that sum in the destruction of property. At length it was perceived, even by the secretary of Finance, that under his provisions of his sales of the tenths, the farmers had contrived to extract from the cultivators eighteen to twenty per cent. instead of ten, and on the national lands forty to fifty instead of twenty-five. The law, like so many others, was soon abandoned, but not till Koletti had compelled Armansperg to employ a number of irregular troops, in the suppression of the revolt, and thus force the government into the first national step which it had taken ; a step, however, nearly as impolitic as national.

After the suppression of this rebellion, the attention of the Regency was occupied in preparing for the removal, or in removing the government from Nauplia to Athens ; an important event, which engaged the whole attention of the rulers of Greece, from the end of the month of September 1834, until the following February. During this period, after a vain attempt to imbibe some Attic salt, an abortive essay was made to open three streets in the new capital. The

evidence of success is likely to be long visible in the trapezoidal form of the few houses which adorn the streets. Even the Government Gazette, the organ through which the applauses of Germany had been hitherto secured by the literary activity of its preceding members, was now forgotten by the Regency, and the decrees from the month of May, that is, the public legislation of Greece, from the month of May, was not printed or published, until the following September. The President of the Regency doubtless has adopted, as a state maxim, that excellent Spanish proverb, "Haste cometh from the Devil."

Some have attempted to explain, and others to apologize for this extraordinary stupor, by asserting that it was caused by the intrigues of General Heideck, and Mr. Greiner, a Bavarian financier, who seems, however, never to have given any other signs of life in Greece. While many even say that Count Armansperg was afraid to act, lest his measures should be thwarted by the influence of Koletti. Subsequent experience, however, has shown, that it is by no means necessary to seek such distant causes of a lethargy which seems habitual.

At length, on the 1st of June, 1835, the wished-for day of the majority of King Otho arrived, and to the delight of the inhabitants of Greece, the Regency ceased to exist. In taking leave of it, it is lamentable to reflect on the total waste of time which marked its conduct, both under Mr. Maurer's period of legislative activity, and Count Armansperg's reign of public lethargy, and private intrigue. Not one single

national measure had been carried into execution. Half the published laws had never been attempted to be enforced, and of the remaining half, great part had been discovered injurious or impracticable, on the first attempts to put them in practice. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that the Greeks should have felt the sincerest joy at the termination of a Government which had so completely neglected all national questions and interests; and the order and tranquillity which generally existed in the country must be received as evidence of the profound attachment of the people to the pursuits of honest industry, when the smallest hopes are held out of their being able to enjoy the fruits of their labors; and a proof that they were infinitely more attached to the real interests of Greece and more capable of pursuing them, than their rulers.

On the first of June, 1835, a new era was expected to commence in Greece, and the popularity and amiable personal qualities of the young monarch who assumed the reins of government were certain to secure him the honest support of the whole nation, and their fullest patience, while he carried into execution all those national measures which his ministers had hitherto neglected, and which were becoming every day more necessary to the permanent tranquillity of the state. His first act was one of moderation and wisdom. He entrusted the entire formation of his ministry to Count Armansperg, who, of all the foreigners then in Greece, was distinguished by the temperance of his views, and who, from having

presided over the Regency for more than two years, must have been supposed to possess some knowledge of the Greeks and of Greece. Count Armansperg was perhaps the only Bavarian who was at that time popular in Greece, and he was known to be strongly supported by the British Cabinet. The choice of the monarch was ratified by the nation, but the satisfaction was of very short duration; for the Count, unable to lay down the sweets of power, named himself Arch Chancellor of Greece, with all the attributes of sole executive minister; and from that day until now, no Greek ministry has been formed—no cabinet has been assembled, and the imperfect administration has generally been from three to six departments entrusted to a single Secretary of State, who communicates with the Chancellor's office on public business, rarely with the Chancellor himself, and almost never with the monarch. The imprudence of this attempt to make "the prince a pageant and the people nothing," is as great as the act itself is unjust, illegal, and according to the acknowledged laws of Greece, criminal.*

The first act of Count Armansperg's power as sole director of the Regency had been to send troops to

* The members of the Cabinet now, are—Count Armansperg, who speaks no Greek. Mr. Troy, royal councillor, neither Greek nor French. Mr. Rizo, minister of the royal household, foreign affairs, justice, religion, and public instruction, no German. General Schmaltz speaks no Greek at least. Admiral Kriezi, neither German nor French. Mr. Mausolas, interior, all the languages known to the others. The finances are *in commendam*, but the director speaks all the languages known to his colleagues.

quell the rebellion in Messenia ; his first act, as Arch Chancellor of Greece, was to dispatch an expedition under General Gordon, to suppress the system of brigandage, which had arrived at an alarming head in Etolia and Acarnania, and along the line of the northern frontier of the kingdom. This expedition had the immediate effect of securing the tranquillity of these provinces ; and had the able and energetic measures of this first and best of English Philhellenes been adopted, Greece would at this day have been in possession of national troops sufficient to have prevented the rebellion of Acarnania and Etolia in the spring of 1836, or rather the causes of that rebellion, which he so ably pointed out and so distinctly predicted, would have been removed, and the precipitate assembly of irregular bands, whose very numbers are unknown to the government of the country, and many of whose officers were last year fighting against General Gordon, would not now have been necessary to preserve the Chancellor in his office.

Count Armansperg soon discovered that in his new position he must make some concessions to popular demands ; and, after long deliberation, he announced the following four measures as on the eve of publication, on which he desired his friends to say, that he requested his reputation as a Statesman might rest.

1. A law for the distribution of the national lands.
2. The nomination of a Council of State.
3. The establishment of a Phalanx, to be composed of the soldiers of the Revolutionary war.

4. The establishment of a Bank.

The absolute necessity of all these measures was universally acknowledged. It only remains to examine in what manner they have been carried into effect. It is needless to enter into any details concerning the nature of these measures, as the discussion, to be of any value, must be far too long to be interesting at a distance from those whose interests are not immediately affected. We shall therefore only state their general results.

Concerning the first we have only to say, that the provisions of the law of dotation, as the ordinance about the national land is termed, has had almost no effect at all; for very few individuals have been willing to accept land on the severe conditions which are imposed on inferior soils; while the dotations which have really taken place, being of land of the best quality already cultivated and yielding a rent, are likely to cause a diminution of the national finances. Fortunately, however, for Greece, the complicated nature of the law has rendered it nearly nugatory for good or evil.

With regard to the Council of State, we shall only remark that the members are well chosen, and though its present constitution renders it of no use at all, it might easily become an institution of great importance, both to the Crown and the nation.

The necessity of some extensive measure in order to do justice to the soldiers of the revolution, and to secure a military force in Greece, seems to have led to the formation of the Phalanx, and, subsequently, to

the enrollment of five regiments of irregulars, under Griva, Giavella, Mamouri, Grigiotti, and Vasso, all distinguished Generals of the revolution. But with all this, Greece has no army and no organized military establishment of any value, regular or irregular, and the actual circumstances of the country will soon force the subject not only on the attention of statesmen in Greece, but also on the protecting powers. The subject, however, is so complex a one, embraces so many interests, and requires the publicity of so many previous reports to ensure just measures and guard against the influence of party and personal prejudice, that, in the few words we could afford it, we are more likely to be misunderstood ourselves, than to throw any light on the subject.

With reference to the establishment of the Bank, it is well known in England that the favorite plan of Count Armansperg was so crude that it was completely rejected. An eminent London Banker, has however, since succeeded, in concert with the Greek Government, in arranging a Charter which while it will afford the most liberal assistance to the Greeks on the most moderate terms, will secure to the capitalists an extensive field of operation for their capital and the amplest security for their advances.*

* The author of this pamphlet having published an *Essai sur les principes de banque appliqués à l'état actuel de la Grèce* at Athens, in opposition to the Count's scheme, has beheld with pleasure that all his principles are adopted in the new charter with a liberality towards Greece, which, while it reflects honor on the Banker who prepared it, proves, what *he* asserted to the Greeks, that the real permanent interest of borrowers and lenders in Banking are inseparable.

The four great measures, on which the Arch Chancellor of Greece has himself requested that his reputation may rest, have now been before the public for nearly a year, and we refer it to the decision of others, if they have tended, in any degree, or are likely to tend, to advance the prosperity of the country, unless they are entirely new modelled on the institutions and usages of Greece, by the people of Greece.

CHAPTER IV.

VIEW OF THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY
AND THE MEANS OF ITS IMPROVEMENT.

EVEN the passing traveller who visits Greece, will soon be convinced, that it is a country in a progressive state of improvement. In spite of the troubles of Tinos, the war of Maina, the rebellion of Messenia, the robbers on the frontiers, the expedition of last year, and the rebellion of the present; the greater part of the country is rapidly passing into a more organized and social state of society. Numerous villages and hamlets have already risen from their ruins, fields of grain now wave, and flocks and herds now pasture, in spots where, three years ago, there were hardly any vestiges of cultivation. Considerable capital has also been laid out, in building in the principal towns. Still, there is a general complaint, that the Government does nothing to aid this progress, and that all this amelioration has been achieved by the industry of individuals, striving against many impediments, which it was all along in the

power of the Government to remove, even without descending from its proper sphere of action.

The most important measure of domestic policy, connected with the progress of Greece, is the conversion of the national lands, by some tenure or other, into private property. The chief basis of any rapid improvement in a new country, (and we believe we may apply this significant phrase to this very old one,) must always be in the advancement of agricultural industry, as the surest step towards an increasing population. Now, the first step towards the improvement of agriculture, is the security of property, and the first step towards the security of property, is the existence of the proprietors. The second step, towards a firm guarantee for the security of property, must be sought in the moral qualities of the proprietors: the foundation of the first step depends solely on the government; and when the government shall have done its duty, it is generally easy to find proprietors, who have sense and spirit enough to fulfil theirs.

To illustrate the extreme importance of this subject in Greece, and to show how closely the national prosperity is connected with it, and how immediately it might be affected by it, we shall mention the state of a numerous body of the population of the Hellenic Kingdom. Great part of the agricultural laborers are not subjects of the new state, but natives of Epirus, Thessaly, and the Ionian islands. Many of the wealthiest shepherds, and most of the masons and carpenters, are Turkish subjects. During the last

three years, the laborers and workmen in Greece, have been earning very high wages; not one quarter of which, from their frugal way of living, they have consumed for food.* The other three quarters have been carried out of the country by these workmen, in their annual winter visit to their families, and has either been spent in their support, in the purchase of clothing which these men always bring new from their own country, where it is cheaper than in Greece, or in extending the cultivation, and ameliorating the condition of Turkish villages. Out of a capital of twenty millions of drachmas, (£715,000,) which has been expended at Athens and the Piraeus, it is conjectured, that ten millions have, in this way, been withdrawn from the national circulation, and have yielded no further profit to the community, by their expenditure, than the annual profit derived by their employers. Now, if this sum had continued to circulate in the kingdom, by being expended in new production by those who received it as wages, it may easily be conceived, how rapidly it must have operated in augmenting the wealth and improving the resources of the country.

The great annual expenditure caused by the location of the population and the reconstruction of so

* Wages in Greece are now, on an average, 2 drachmas for agricultural laborers; Masons and Carpenters from 2 to 4 a day. A bushel of wheat costs at Athens 4 1-2 drachmas; barley, 2 1-2; maize about the same. The drachma is about 8 1-2d, that is, six to a Spanish dollar. There are parts of Greece, where day labor is at one drachma, and wheat at three drachmas the bushel.

many towns and villages has now nearly ceased, and the numbers of the foreign workmen being diminished, and all their wages having disappeared, what might easily have been anticipated, has occurred. There is a general stagnation of business. While this state of things was staring government in the face, it was more than once called upon to examine, whether it were not possible to adopt some measures to retain this capital, and induce these workmen to settle in the country. It was all in vain; the case had not been foreseen in the lectures on political economy, of any professor, from Liege to Dorpat. One definite measure, which seemed likely to combine both these results, was thrown out for the consideration of government. As this measure was in perfect harmony with the avowed policy of government, and even, if not successful, could be attended with no evil consequences, it remains to this day to be explained, why it was not attempted to be carried into execution. It was proposed to commence selling small lots of building-ground, with wells and ruined houses, in those towns to which the greatest numbers of the foreign workmen resorted. Bargains of this nature, holding out hopes of great profit from the employment of small sums of money, would have probably induced many of the strangers to become proprietors. Even if the purchaser should have been unable or unwilling to remove his family to Greece, the circumstance of his possessing property in the country, would have established a degree of connection, which would have led to continual visits. A

very short time would have sufficed to show to his fellow-citizens, whether property was more secure and more burdened with taxes, in the Hellenic Kingdom, or in Turkey ; and if the question had been decided in favor of Greece, many would have been induced to follow the example. The foundation would have thus been laid for an immigration highly advantageous to liberated Greece, an intercourse, from which she was likely ultimately to secure an influx of the two things she stands in most need of,—capital and inhabitants. At the same time, such a connection as this would be the most effectual means of extending the influence of Greece over the opinions of the Greek rayahs, and of directing their attention to the progress of the Greek kingdom. That it would have been attended with considerable success, we have been assured by several respectable Greek subjects of Turkey, who, in visiting Greece, have regretted the difficulties in the way of purchasing property in the country.

A second measure of equal importance in improving the state of the country, and which might have been rendered the means of raising a large capital for an hypothetic loan fund, was the sale of lots of national land in the immediate vicinity of those villages and towns which are chiefly private property, and which possess a wealthy peasantry. That there are a few such *cases* even in Greece, may be easily understood, from the fact of there being villages in the richest parts of the country, which are private property, while those around are national. The first

paying only ten per cent. of land tax, and the second twenty-five, it is evident, that where these live, those must grow wealthy in a few years. There is also proof of this being actually the case, as the small portions of land which are accidentally offered for sale in these favored situations, generally bring twenty years purchase as their price. Government, however, determinedly refused to enter into examination of details on this subject, asserting that every possible evil, whether already in existence, or which, by the varying combination of circumstances can be called into existence, is provided for, by the general measures adopted in the law of dotation.

Indeed, such supineness prevailed on all practical subjects connected with the welfare of Greece, that great numbers of respectable Sciotes, Samians, and Cretans, who intended to settle in the country, have quitted it and returned to their respective islands.* The necessity of establishing colonies in Greece, had been continually spoken of, and Count Armansperg had, himself, been engaged for at least a year, in drawing up a law on this subject; but it was at last discovered, that the project of making a German America of Greece, required the consent of the inhabitants, and that such consent was not very likely

* Any publicity on these subjects, would doubtless awaken the government, but it denies facts unless they are published in an official form. Let a return be made of the numbers of the Greeks who have quitted the country with property for Turkey, and one of the Greeks and strangers who have brought property to the country, and attention be paid to the balance both in numbers and property.

to be accorded even to the benevolent Count. The fond and long cherished expectation of founding a colony which should avoid all the faults of the English colonial system, and give, as was expected, an active expression to the feelings of the civilization of the nineteenth century was abandoned. The Greeks showing no anxiety that these fine expressions should be carried into practice at their expense. They were ready to give a hospitable reception to foreigners who would pay their own way, but they objected, as they themselves express it, that any man should learn to shave on their heads.

It would be unfair to pass over the subject of Colonies, without stating what has actually been performed. Much has been said and published about colonies of Ipsariots, Macedonians, and Epirots. An Ipsariote colony, of some thirty families, has actually been established amidst the ruins of Eretria, and government has contributed to its existence, not much certainly to its prosperity, by a donation of ten acres of a poor soil in the neighborhood, to each family. A colony of Macedonians is *on the eve* of formation at Atalanta, in a richer plain and under equally liberal auspices. And when the situation of the Epirot colony is decided on, and the colonists found, government will be equally liberal to them. In the mean time thousands of families have been reduced to poverty, waiting in expectation of being able to settle on the waste national lands.

* * * They have tried
What hell it is in suing long to bide.

As the emigration of Europeans to Greece has been sometimes recommended, it may perhaps be worth while to state the reasons which are generally considered in the country, as conclusive against its success. The fact, which we have already mentioned, that there is a numerous population of Greeks in Turkey, speaking the language, accustomed to the climate, and skilled in the usual modes of industry now practised, and who at present visit the country as laborers with little expense and loss of time, shows that foreigners of the lower orders have very little chance of competing with them. The difficulty of purchasing small portions of land at reasonable prices, precludes the immigration of farmers and small capitalists, whose own labor would be a considerable part of their capital. And now, the establishment of the National Bank will render it a wiser and safer plan for large capitalists to invest their money in it, than to select themselves the means of employing it, unless they have long experience of the country and inhabitants. Still there is a class of persons who may find Greece a place of agreeable and profitable retirement. To those who possess small fortunes, (from four to ten thousand pounds) and who wish to enjoy the advantages of that little society which a capital of 15,000 inhabitants affords, with that mental refinement which so small a fortune could with difficulty procure in any other part of Europe, Athens offers some advantages. To such persons to whom the climate may be agreeable, and who intend to make a long residence, profitable

means of employing their capital would be easily found.

The commerce of Greece has not made the same rapid progress during the last three years, as the agriculture; and it at present suffers very severely from the general stagnation of business. It is probable that much might be done to remove this; but Governments in general do so little but harm by meddling with commercial legislation, that the Greek government would do well to lay down the rule of confining itself as much as possible to the removal of impediments, to the extension of commerce, where they are found to exist. We regret extremely to see that she has already begun to depart from that soundest of all financial principles—never to impose any duty which is not for the purpose of raising a revenue.—She has lately imposed a duty on the importation of foreign grain. At present, the minimum import duty on commerce is one of ten per cent. ad valorem, levied on the valuation made at the Greek custom-house; and the export duty is one of six per cent. As long, therefore, as the export and import duties of Turkey continue at three per cent., there can be little doubt that a very extensive smuggling trade must be carried on in a country which possesses such a line of coast, and such numerous islands as Greece; and it is probable that the revenue would gain considerably by a diminution of this duty.

There is an ordinance * relating to the shipping

* November 23, 1833.

interest of Greece, which appears to us highly impolitic, and likely to inflict more serious moral injury on the country than what could flow from the mere loss of revenue. By it, all foreign capital is excluded from employment in Greek vessels, and all foreign flags are shut out from the carrying trade of Greece. We shall not offer any observation on the general policy of such laws: it is with reference to the Archipelago alone, that we intend to examine its effects on the real interests of Greece. As far as Turkey is concerned, it is likewise a departure from the principles of reciprocity, or the present fashionable system of commercial legislation, the doctrine of tit for tat. The Turks allow Greeks to be part owners of vessels under the Turkish flag, and permit Greek boats to engage in the coasting trade of their islands; and even if they were to prohibit it, in their progress towards European civilization, the Government of liberated Greece ought not to forget, that the Turkish bottoms which would engage in their carrying trade are all owned by Greeks, and that the augmentation of vessels in this situation would only tend ultimately to secure the union of the country of the proprietors to the new state, by a community of interests. And in strict justice, do not the sacrifices of the Sciots, Ispariots, and Samiots, in the cause of Greek independence, require that every thing should be done on the part of liberated Greece to alleviate their present lot?* It is not their fault, it is their

* It may be asked, what does the present Government, Bavarians or Phanariotes know about the Greek revolution? We own, but little.

misfortune that they are now rayahs. The very idea, too, of excluding foreign capital from entering a country, where the rate of interest on commercial voyages of a fortnight is never less than two per cent. a month, and generally three, seems to argue an unnecessary alarm for the rapid increase of navigation, and the speedy accumulation of capital, or else an unexampled sensitiveness on the decline of profits.

It appears to us, that it would have merited the attention of the Greek government, to strive as much as possible, to amalgamate the interests of all the Greek nation with the prosperity of the Greek Kingdom; instead of seeking by this petty legislation, to awaken discussions, and create distinctions and opposition of interests, between the Greeks who are subjects of King Otho, and those who are subjects of Sultan Mahmoud. It is on such occasions as this, that the local knowledge and national feelings of an efficient Council of State, or of a legislative assembly would have been invaluable to King Otho, and saved his kingdom from the laws of pedantic ignorance. With what delight must Russia behold this powerful and wealthy body of rayahs driven to fix their eyes on her for protection, and how different will be her conduct towards the legacy which she has received from Greece!

We have thus pointed out two sources of which an intelligent government might have availed itself, and indeed might still avail itself, in some small degree, in order to exercise a moral influence over that part of the Greek nation still subject to Turkey, by

improving its condition, and binding it to the new kingdom by ties of affection and personal interest. Means, too, which are so scarcely found without violating that great rule, which ought always to direct a government, of never meddling with the affairs of the people, except when the business requiring interference, falls strictly within the exclusive province of the general administration.

We are now compelled to allude to a subject which we would willingly have passed over, had it not been more necessary than any other fact we have yet mentioned, to convey an exact idea of the feelings which regulate the conduct of the present administration of Greece, and of the sentiments with which that administration must of necessity be viewed by the people at large. Undue favor in political and military promotions, honors and money taken or given as rewards of political intrigue or subserviency, are so certainly the invariable consequence of the absence of responsibility and publicity in public business, that, though they excite dissatisfaction in the higher classes of society, they are generally disregarded by the mass of the nation. There is one subject, however, on which the poor and the rich feel alike, and where the deadliest opposition may be created by the smallest violation of justice. All feel that the social contract is invaded, the first bonds of society rent asunder, and the continuance of the union of its members rendered dependent on force alone. This crisis in society, is produced by the deliberate violation of the rights of property. Now, that such a systematical

violation of the rights of property has taken place in Greece, whenever the pettiest interest of the government has prompted, is felt through the whole country.

We have instanced the violation of a solemn contract at Patras. In the capital, however, direct seizures of property occur daily. If a palace, a mint, a printing-office, a stable, or a public nuisance is to be established, or a colony to be founded, the property of individuals is seized, without even the formality of informing the proprietors, whose very landmarks are thus lost.* A plan of the town of Athens was adopted by royal ordinance, and it was declared that Government would take the land appropriated in that plan for public buildings, at the rate of £30 an acre within six months. Under the guarantee of this law, many individuals purchased land in the environs of the actual town at £150, and £200 an acre. Yet Government has now annulled the contract, and insisted that it is entitled to select any piece of land for public purposes, at the rate of £30 an acre. As the inhabitants have protested against this, and as it is known that a foreign consul, whose property had been seized in this way, succeeded in making advantageous *private* arrangements with the government, no payments of any kind have yet been made, and government has remained nearly two years in possession of land for which nothing has ever been paid.

* We refer Count Armanberg to his Bible. Deut. c. xix. 14. Thou shalt not remove thy neighbor's land-mark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance.

The late seizure of the land of an American religious mission, and a Russian consul general, may perhaps bring matters to a crisis, and compel Count Armansperg to adopt some measures, less at variance with the principles of justice than his former conduct. Can he, who is said to have shared the enthusiastic scheme of making Greece a second America, seriously believe that "the country beyond the Atlantic, where now a younger Europe flourishes," reached her present unexampled wealth, glory and happiness, by such principles as he acts on.

There now remains one important way, in which the moral influence of liberated Greece may be very extensively, though indirectly, beneficial in improving the condition of that part of the nation still under a foreign domination, to which we may allude. It is well known, that the subject of Education has excited great attention among the better classes in Greece. The most popular of the Greek newspapers, the *Athena*, is filled with discussions on this subject; and many of the villages and towns of liberated Greece, even before the constitution of their communes, have built and endowed public schools. A strong desire for education pervades every class of society. Here, then, a field is opened to the government, of exerting the most powerful and beneficial influence on the whole Greek nation. The establishment of a University in the Hellenic Kingdom, on the plan of those of Germany, with those provisions for exact discipline amongst the members which the circumstances may be found to require, would

not only be of great advantage to liberated Greece, but would also tend to create and disseminate a community of feeling wherever the Greek language is spoken. The formation of a public library which would afford means for students even of mature age to pursue their studies, and the endowments of a special college for Theological studies, are loudly called for, by the demand for schoolmasters and educated priests in all the provinces of Greece, and Turkey. Would not this truly National undertaking better warrant the expenditure of the loan, than the journey of a Bavarian architect, to make a new plan of Athens, or than the excavation of the Acropolis, the rebuilding of the Parthenon, the building of a mint, or a transit warehouse, and the maintenance of a regiment of lancers, or a military school? * At present, the establishments for education are trifling, though, from the number of able Professors, little is wanting, but that Government should provide the necessary buildings, and furnish the means which depend on it, in order to form a flourishing University.

The success of a University in Greece, would un-

* Our reasons are these; the plan of the architect has been rejected; the expenses of the excavation, render the price paid for the antiquities found, excessive; the Parthenon, if rebuilt, would not do for a University; the mint is an object of luxury, as the money might be coined cheaper by contract; the transit warehouse is always empty, as Athens imports only for her own consumption; the lancers on service, in the mountains of Greece, must leave their lances behind; and we conceive civil education is of far more importance than military, and ought to take precedency.

questionably be most brilliant, and would reflect more lasting glory on the reign of King Otho, and enable him to exercise a wider influence over the Greek nation, than all the military and antiquarian establishments of his kingdom. No people can supply a greater proportion of men, able and willing to fill the chairs of such an establishment. These professors would bring to their task an enthusiasm which would immediately find a responding feeling in the breasts of their pupils, and they would awaken an echo, which would be repeated through Europe and Asia, as far as Greek is a spoken language. Every Greek feels himself connected with the literary glory of his ancestors, and he would soon be proud of that of his contemporaries. The anxiety the Greeks feel about such an institution, and the eagerness with which they would contribute to its prosperity, is shown by the magnificent donations which many wealthy Greeks have already furnished in books and money. Yet, with all this disposition on the part of the people, the school-houses commenced by Capodistrius, are either left unfinished,* by the present government, or turned into barracks for the gens-d'armes.†

It may here, perhaps, be justly observed, that all plans for the improvement of a country proposed by strangers, ought to be regarded with suspicion. The vanity of projecting, is too apt to lead the most phlegmatic and judicious to overrate the circumstances,

* As at Corinth, and Megara.

† As at Loidoriki, &c.

which are favorable to their plans, and to overlook those which are unfavorable. Foreigners, even when they perfectly understand the language of a country, can generally no more acquire the feelings, than they can the exterior appearance of natives. Entertaining this opinion, we own we have looked with wonder at the proceedings of the European statesmen, who have established, in Greece, a form of administration, which compels the Greeks to seek for every improvement in the projects of foreigners, ignorant, even of the language and manners of the people. In a country issuing from a revolution, a foreigner is entrusted with the whole executive and legislative authority, unrestrained by the ties of naturalization, and unaided by any institution which can influence his conduct, according to the interests of the people whom he has been appointed to govern. In a country where the national institutions and habits of society had established feelings of the most democratic equality amongst all the subjects, a foreigner is placed between the throne and the people, to separate the monarch from the nation, and to leave the throne supported only by the supposed talents of the Arch-chancellor. The very form of administration which has invariably placed the governed and their governors in mortal opposition, and has been productive of more revolutions than any other known combination of power, is thus adopted with the sanction of the three most enlightened powers in Europe, as the surest means of establishing tranquillity in Greece. We are irresistibly compelled to conjecture,

what can have been the ulterior projects of statesmen who have departed so far from the lessons of practical wisdom. Can the English cabinet seriously think that their influence can maintain this state of things without the aid of British funds; or are they prepared to come before parliament and ask more money to pursue their speculations in the art of Government? For our own parts, we venture to predict that a very short continuance of the present system will compel the Sovereign of Greece to call a national assembly, and deliver the country at the same time from the tutelage of the Chancellor and its other protectors.

Such is the present threatening state of affairs in Greece. Let us inquire if it be not possible, by some means in perfect accordance with the existing institutions of the Hellenic Monarchy, to organize the general administration of the kingdom in a manner which, while it immediately secures a due expression of popular opinion, will guarantee a stability of measures and consistency of political views which has been vainly sought for in the vacillating conduct of foreign Regents and Chancellors. In Greece, as in every country which possesses popular institutions, such as we have already shown exist in her municipal organization, no government can be permanent, which is not directly influenced by, and which does not move in constant accord with public opinion. At the same time, we are well aware that the machine of government must be so constructed as to ensure the expression of public opinion, without

allowing the popular will to be the director of the executive power. That this can be permanently and securely done without the existence of a legislative assembly, and a complete and responsible ministry we hold to be impossible. We conceive these to be the only sure guarantees of the stability of the Greek Monarchy, and we shall therefore examine by what practical measures their formation can be facilitated.

To proceed cautiously, the first change which must be made in actual administration, is, to create a machinery by which the institutions and usages of the Greeks can be made known to the government, and enabled to exert some influence on the actual legislation. We conceive this to be the first step towards good government ; as institutions and usages are far more powerful ever to direct a people than civil laws and political constitutions. That this may be done without any change in the individuals who now hold elevated situations, we think of importance, as we see that the change of individuals and names, is the present receipt proposed by reformers in Greece ; a receipt, which, whatever be the faults or virtues of individuals, is sure to be fallacious in a disorganized government.

We suggest, therefore, that the present Council of State should be charged to prepare reports on every subject on which the government feels itself called upon to legislate, that these reports, signed by the members who draw them up, and supported when necessary by requisite evidence of facts should be

published by the government, and on the expression of public opinion which follows this publication, the ordinances of the government be prepared. If the present Council of State do not contain a sufficient number of persons able to do this work, it will be requisite to make the necessary addition to its number. We shall not plunge into any explanation of the details by which this system can be put into immediate execution ; we shall content ourselves with saying that the present system of preparing ordinances, and laws changing the institutions of the Kingdom, and taxing its inhabitants in the private room of the Arch-chancellor, and transmitting them to the present inefficient Council of State with an order to return them ratified in forty-eight hours, cannot endure much longer. Experience has shown that such laws are despised by the people, and ridiculed by the *employés* of the state, as being inapplicable to the state of the country in their details, even when founded on sound principles, and the maxim "qui æquum statuerit, parte inaudita altera, etiam si æquum statuerit, haud æquus fuerit," is as sound morality in legislation as in law.

There is, however, one advantage which would result from this mode of referring the legislation of Greece to the present Council of State, which is likely to have more weight with the present disposers of affairs in that country, than the mere feelings of justice. They will, perhaps, begin to perceive that this is the only manner by which the administration can be prepared to meet a national

assembly, and by which they can know what measures a national assembly would be likely to adopt, or by what means its votes and resolutions can be guided. The habits of business and public discussion as a means of advancing instead of retarding public affairs, can only be learnt by habit and experience, and the practice which the members of the Council of State would have in this way, would render them powerful in the national assembly to which many of them from their local influence and high character are sure to be returned. With regard to the necessity of calling together a national assembly, whatever may be its effect, we look upon it as at no very distant period, inevitable, and we consider it as indispensable towards laying the permanent foundations of the Greek monarchy.

To conclude: we shall offer a few observations on the actual resources of the Kingdom, in order that a just comparison may be drawn between their extent and the political results which the Hellenic Kingdom has been expected to work out in the European republic. The revenues of Greece are estimated at about £400,000 stg., and the population little above 650,000 souls. The amount of taxation paid by each individual is therefore about 12s, 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ d sterling. The contribution of a family of five persons, amounts to £3. 1s. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ d; which is a rate of taxation exceeding that of Sweden, Naples, Spain, and Ireland. This amount levied in a country so thinly peopled as Greece, where the price of grain is so low, and the expenses of transport are so very great, is worthy of

careful observation on the part of those who speculate on the future prosperity of the country. Indeed it is evident that in a country which counts not more than 36 inhabitants to a square mile, no such amount of taxation could ever be levied, unless the rent of a great part of the cultivated land in the Kingdom were included in the sources of national revenue. We have already mentioned that Government possesses great part of the Kingdom, and that Government property pays 15 per cent. more land tax than the property of private individuals. We fear that this rate of taxation is too high to allow of any permanent or considerable increase in the wealth and population of the country. There is too little of the national land which is of a sufficiently good quality as to permit the cultivator to commence his operations by the payment of twenty-five per cent. of the gross produce, with the contingent burden of being compelled, according to the present law, to transport that twenty-five per cent. to a distance of six hours. The cultivation of land in Greece is not likely to be much extended or the population augmented until some change takes place in this law. Indeed, in general the government of Greece does not appear to be sensible that the resources of the country can be seriously augmented only by that part of the national income which is left in the pockets of the people: it is too much employed in endeavoring to turn the national resources into its own pockets, where they are spent, if not lavishly, at least unproductively. This fact, that hardly any fund remains

to the people for improving their condition, sufficiently explains the reason of the comparatively slow progress made by the Greek peasants, when compared with the population of other new countries.*

The annual expenditure of Greece has hitherto amounted to about £650,000, exceeding the revenue by about £250,000. Of this sum the army has absorbed about £390,000, within £10,000 of the whole revenue of the kingdom. As the army absorbs such an extraordinary portion of the revenue, it must be of importance to know exactly its amount and its state of efficiency; but as no returns are ever published, and as the organization of the army is in a continual state of change, it is extremely difficult to catch the fleeting form of the fashion of an hour.

During the month of September, last year, the amount of the Greek army was stated by government to the allied powers to be about 9,250 men, in nearly equal portions of Greeks and Bavarians. Of these, the regular troops, consisting of eight battalions of infantry, a regiment of artillery, one of pioneers, and one of lancers, amounted to nearly 6,000 men. And a corps of Greek gendarmes, an efficient and

* The mode in which the tenths are now collecting (July, 1836,) may be cited as proof. Ten sheaves are selected from the heaps at the threshing-floors, and their produce is taken as the scale of the proportion which the peasant is compelled to pay. To make the imposition greater, the grain is weighed, and he must deliver dry grain by weight. The tenth, by this manœuvre of gout, becomes a tax of twenty per cent., the tax of twenty-five becomes fifty. I need not allude to the abuses of such a system of fraud on the part of the Government.

useful body of men, who have distinguished themselves by their valor and good conduct, was about 1000 strong. The rest were light armed troops in the Greek dress, but with a regular system of organization without regular discipline.

At present the death and retirement of a number of Bavarians, have reduced the regular battalions to four, of which the two Bavarians are now in part officered by Greeks. So rapid has been the decline of the regular troops, who are no longer favorites of the existing administration, that their number at present cannot exceed 3000 men. The gendarmes who are to a certain degree regular, are reduced to about 800. And a new class of troops, without any organization or discipline, collected by their own chiefs, has been assembled as a force capable of defending the state; they are facetiously called national guards, as a caution, probably, to the nation to guard itself against them. The formation of the Phalanx, too, with its corps of officers, has enabled the army to be brought to such a state of efficiency, that we believe there is one officer in it for every two privates.* Whether it is the intention of Count Armansperg to abolish regular troops, and return to the system of palikarism as in the revolution, is not yet known; but a few months of the present system of vacillation will have the effect of as completely dis-

* Count Armansperg seems now occupied in re-assembling the very identically bands he dispersed by the ordinance of March 14, 1833. He has already shaken hands with one proscribed chief of robbers against whom he dispatched troops last year. See page 54.

solving the regular army, as a royal ordinance itself. We have already said that the present state of military affairs in Greece loudly demands the attention of the King, and the nation, and that without publicity, truth will never be attained, or wise measures adopted.

That the national spirit of the Greeks is decidedly directed to naval affairs, is proved by the reputation which they earned for skill and daring, in their maritime warfare with the Turks. The names of Miaoulis,* and Kanaris, will be cherished with respect and admiration, as long as capacity and courage, successfully exerted in a good cause, awaken the gratitude of mankind. The aptitude of the Greek sailors in acquiring habits of discipline, have been displayed on several occasions, though the circumstance of the best seamen using exclusively the Albanian language, has thrown impediments in the way of its introduction, with this difficulty of language to contend with, officers must possess patience equal to their skill, or they cannot hope to succeed. The exploits of Captain Hastings, with a crew chiefly Hydriate, show what may be done by ability and perseverance. The steam-vessel commanded by that officer was the

* Miaoulis, the best of the Greeks—the purest character of the revolution—is now no more. Though not a man of brilliant genius, he was a hero—and his name will go down to posterity as such. In a country where faction rages, he never had an enemy; and where disorder was universal, he alone by a respect felt for his courage and disinterested patriotism, could secure the obedience of a fleet of sixty vessels, from every island of the Archipelago when the government of the country could not command one.

first vessel from which red-hot shot have been habitually used at sea. Now, it is clear to every body, that the operation of heating a sixty-eight pound shot, and firing a number of these, and loaded shells, from a vessel, must be an operation of such delicacy and danger, as can only be undertaken, where the crew displays the greatest order, activity, and intelligence.

Yet Captain Hastings, in a memoir on the subject, mentions, that during little more than a year's service, he fired 18,000 shells, and a considerable number of red-hot shot, and burnt seven Turkish vessels without a single accident on board his own ship.* We grieve to say, that the Greek navy is now in such a lamentable state of disorganization and inefficiency, that we cannot trust ourselves to make any observations on the subject.

It remains for us now only to notice the administration of Justice, and the conduct of the business of the department of the interior. Time will doubtless be required to model the execution of the laws of Greece to the exigencies of the country; but as the attention of the Greeks is always directed to this subject, there can be no doubt, that it will be effectually done, as soon as they are enabled, by means of a Council of State modelled as we have proposed, and

* See a memoir on the use of Shells and hot shot from Ship artillery, by Captain Frank Abney Hastings—London, 1828, Ridge-way. This able officer died of a wound received near Missolonghi, shortly after writing the above memoir at the request of the author of the present pamphlet.

by a national assembly, to take part in their own legislation.

The trial by jury in criminal cases, has already been introduced with the greatest success, and we have very little doubt that its extension to civil cases would be attended with great advantages; for there is no other institution of Western Europe, so completely in conformity with the manners and usages of the Greek people. Indeed they have been so long accustomed to a nearly similar mode of deciding judicial affairs by the presence of the heads of families, with the village magistrate and priest, that the institution of juries seems, even to the lower orders, to be nearly an improvement on their own system, the advantages of which they fully appreciate.

With regard to the civil administration of the country, as connected with the ministry of the interior, it is impossible for the most indifferent traveller not to perceive, that it is in the most deplorable state of inefficiency. Based on the system of centralization, without the influence and power of an established and complete organization, it is in direct opposition to the habits and usages of the people, and becomes an impediment to the settlement of the local affairs of the provinces, by introducing the theories of ministers, where they are absolutely injurious,* and

* One of the Greek ministers proposed that the cultivation of Indian corn should be prohibited in Greece, as being unhealthy. He was with difficulty silenced by the probability of people who did not mind about dying of fever, using violent means to avoid death by starvation. If publicity had existed in Greece, could this man have continued to be minister six months longer ?

the intrigues of political parties where they would otherwise remain unknown. Until the popular institutions of the country are brought into direct communication with the administrative department of the interior, we feel persuaded that little will be done for the permanent organization of Greece. Every body who appreciates the advantages of simplicity and publicity in the administration of public affairs, must perceive how great gainers the Greeks would immediately be by this change.*

To conclude : it is our opinion, that if the Greek monarchy is to make those advances towards prosperity, which the state of the country warrant, it can only be done by adopting a completely new system of administration and government. By returning immediately to the native institutions of Greece, in the administration of the affairs of the villages, by connecting this with the communal system, and putting that system in execution, and by creating some organ for the expression of public opinion in the highest sphere, and on questions of general legislation and administration, whether it be an efficient Council of State, or, what is far better, a legislative assembly. Publicity, however, must be introduced into every department of the public administration, in order that foreigners, whether they be Bavarians or Fanariotes,

* So necessary was a change felt to be, even by the Chancellor, that, since writing the above, he has changed the 10 Nomarchies and 42 Eparchies, into which Greece was divided, into 30 districts and 17 subdistricts, as if the fault of the system lay in calling Count Armansperg chancellor, instead of prime minister. The fault really lies in despising the people, and contemning justice.

may no longer render Greece one extensive system of private jobbing. There must be budgets and accounts of public expenditure regularly published wherever public wrong has been received, whether in the villages, or by the general government. The maxim hitherto current, that the people exist merely to be governed, and that the government itself is the state, must be laid aside altogether. Unless this is done, and done speedily, the cry for a national assembly will become irresistible and the excitement under which the assembly itself will meet, will be too great to ensure the adoption of prudent measures. In some way or other, Greece must obtain a system of government, in conformity with the usages of civilized Europe, and adapted to her own institutions, as her existence as an independent state is impossible. When such a system is adopted however, we have little doubt that the energies of the Greek nation will soon be displayed in the advancement and prosperity of liberated Greece, and that its progress will rival that of the most favored countries. The active and industrious population of the Hellenic Kingdom may then be secure of exerting a powerful moral influence over the fortunes and happiness of those millions of their countrymen, who still groan under a foreign yoke. The moral improvement, if those Greeks hold out, in our opinion, the only rational hope of re-establishing order amidst the increasing anarchy of the Ottoman Empire, and may secure the union of some part of its population under a system of political equality, which may prevent its subjection by Russia. At all


events, the prosperity of the Greek Kingdom is the first step towards the civilization of the East, and is of more importance to Europe, than its mere connection with the repayment of expended loans, or even than the mere political question of Hellenic independence could alone make it. The moral condition of several millions of mankind, and the ultimate civilization of Western Asia, can only be improved and advanced by the prosperity and good government of the subjects of King Otho.


NOTE, page 44. The Fanariotes are a class of Greeks, so called, because the families from which they originated, inhabited a quarter of Constantinople called the Fanari. From this class the Porte used to select its Dragomans, (interpreters) who became important state officers, and some of whom were rewarded with the sovereignties of Moldavia and Wallachia. They were educated with much care, became great linguists, and were distinguished for political tact and cunning. The rest of the Greeks are jealous and suspicious of the Fanariotes; some of them, however, have done the State some service; as Mavrocordatos, and others.













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